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W h i l e Chinese economic reform b e g a n in 1978, it was 
not u n t i l 1984 that sweeping reform m e a s u r e s were 
introduced in the urban industrial sector. To overcome 
the p r o b l e m s of the rigid central p l a n n i n g system, the 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g powers to 
e n t e r p r i s e s has become the guiding principle of 
e n t e r p r i s e r e f o r m . Various reform measures have been 
i n t r o d u c e d in order to raise the p r o d u c t i v i t y of state 
e n t e r p r i s e s and stimulate w o r k i n c e n t i v e . Furthermore, 
factor m a r k e t s have gradually b e e n liberalized and the 
d u a l - p r i c e system is introduced to improve allocative 
e f f i c i e n c y . 
The apparent success of Chinese economic reform has 
aroused the interest of e c o n o m i s t s . Various studies 
have b e e n conducted to examine links between the 
reform m e a s u r e s and the efficiency of state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s . However, there is no consensus on the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of reform measures on improving 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and work incentive. This thesis is an 
attempt to examine the links between reform and 
p r o d u c t i v i t y at the aggregate level and firm level, 
m a k i n g u s e of a data set on Wuhan‘s state-owned 
enterprises . 
The following controversial issues will be examined： 
(1) A n increase output m a y not imply an improvement 
in p r o d u c t i v i t y . Through estimating a production 
function of Wuhan for the period 1962-92, industrial 
p r o d u c t i v i t y trends before and after the reform period 
can be c o m p a r e d . 
(2) The s o u r c e s of productivity^ changes are 
explored. They include the impact of R&D and firm 
size on technological progress, and the effectiveness 
i 
； • • 
of retained profit； bonus and fringe benefits on work 
i n c e n t i v e . 
(3) Since the convergence of factor returns implies 
an improvement in allocative efficiency, a simple 
e s t i m a t i o n on factor returns is undertaken to examine 
w h e t h e r there is a tendency for factor returns to 
c o n v e r g e . 
To explore the above issues, a new data set on 
Wuhan‘s state-owned enterprises is employed. The 
estimation of productivity changes is based on a time 
series data set of Wuhan's state industry for the 
years 1 9 6 2 - 9 2 . The findings suggest that the 
development of state industry is greatly influenced by 
the national policies. Before 1978, the productivity 
fluctuated violently due to the political movements. 
In the reform era, the growth rate of productivity has 
b e e n higher and more stable. Thus, the reform has 
improved the performance of industry by creating a 
relatively stable economic environment. 
To investigate the sources of productivity 
differences among enterprises, the enterprise-level 
panel data of Wuhan are employed. Such a data set 
reduces the problem of multicollinearity, omitted 
variables and provides the flexibility to analyze the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y differences among sectors as well as 
e n t e r p r i s e s . The study concludes that RSD is the most 
important factor that accounts for productivity 
d i f f e r e n c e s . Firm size has an advantage in technology 
advancement. The vintage of capital does not have 
significant effects on productivity implying that the 
purchase of new technology is not a sufficient means 
to raise productivity. Finally, among those measures 
to promote work incentive, retained profit has closer 
link with the performance of enterprises than bonus 
ii 
and fringe b e n e f i t s . It is thus more effective in 
raising workers‘ incentive. 
Through the study of the factor returns, the result 
suggests that the market for material inputs shows a 
tendency to converge in the period 1987-89 because the 
pace of liberalization in that market is much faster 
than that of other factor m a r k e t s . However, much 
remains to be done to improve allocative efficiency in 
the labour market and capital market where factors are 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
T h e T h i r d P l e n u m of 11th Party Congress in 1978 
u s h e r e d in a series of e c o n o m i c r e f o r m in C h i n a . 
H o w e v e r , f a r - r e a c h i n g reforms were initially l i m i t e d 
to the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector； u r b a n industrial reforms 
w e r e o n l y i n t r o d u c e d on an e x p e r i m e n t a l b a s i s . The 
i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r entered a new era in O c t o b e r 1984 
w h e n the T h i r d P l e n u m of 12th Party Congress of China 
a f f i r m e d the n e e d for u r b a n industrial reforms and put 
f o r w a r d a s e r i e s of p o l i c i e s to a c c e l e r a t e r e f o r m . 
T h e f o l l o w i n g is on the agenda of u r b a n reform：(1) the 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g powers to 
e n t e r p r i s e s t o g e t h e r w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of profit-
sharing s c h e m e , t a x - f o r - p r o f i t scheme and other 
c o n t r a c t i n g out schemes； (2) the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of 
factor m a r k e t s a n d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the d u a l - p r i c e 
s y s t e m (i.e., the coexistence of m a r k e t prices and 
p l a n n e d prices)； (3) changes in workers‘ remuneration 
s y s t e m a n d job tenure system to improve e f f i c i e n c y . 
A l t h o u g h the growth rate of industrial output 
is h i g h d u r i n g the reform p e r i o d , it does not imply an 
i m p r o v e m e n t in p r o d u c t i v i t y . Several studies^ have 
e x a m i n e d p r o d u c t i v i t y changes of the state industry, 
b u t there is no consensus on this issue especially for 
the e a r l y r e f o r m p e r i o d (1978-84)• This thesis 
s u p p l e m e n t s p r e v i o u s studies by examining the 
i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t in W u h a n for the p e r i o d 1962-92 
a n d i n v e s t i g a t e s the effect of national policies on 
p r o d u c t i v i t y c h a n g e s . Furthermore, w e explore the 
sources of p r o d u c t i v i t y changes in the Chinese 
i n d u s t r i a l sector u n d e r the influence of reform2. 
R e v i e w i n g p r e v i o u s studies on this issue' m a n y 
p o t e n t i a l factors are considered but the effects of 
— y 
Isee Chow (1993). Tidrick (1986) , Chen et al (1988). McGuckin (1992) and Jefferson (1992). 
2see e.g. Jefferson (1989). McGuckin et al (1992, 1993). Lee (1991), etc. 
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such factors as bonus are still controversial and the 
u s e of a g g r e g a t e d data in m a n y studies m a y cause b i a s . 
To overcome the problem of a g g r e g a t i o n , this thesis 
employs a set of enterprise-level panel data which can 
reduce such problems as m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y , omitted 
v a r i a b l e s and provides the flexibility to study the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y differences among sectors as well as 
e n t e r p r i s e s . The study intends to analyze the effects 
of R&D and firm size on technology advancement, the 
effectiveness of bonus, fringe benefits and retained 
p r o f i t on raising work incentive and productivity. 
W h i l e the analysis of industrial productivity 
d i s c u s s e d is concerned with technical efficiency, i.e., 
shifts in the production function, it is also 
interesting to explore whether the introduction of the 
m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m and the liberalization of the factor 
markets improve allocative e f f i c i e n c y . The relaxation 
of control over the factor m a r k e t s under reform is 
likely to induce the convergence of returns, resulting 
in an improvement in allocative efficiency. Previous 
studies m a i n l y compare the convergence of marginal 
products of different types of ownership, e.g., 
state-owned enterprises verse collective enterprises. 
In this thesis, the convergence of different factors 
is compared and their relationship with the degree of 
openness of the factor market is explored. 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 
briefly introduces the enterprise management system 
before 1978 (section 1.1), the enterprise reform after 
1978 (section 1.2) and the city of W u h a n (section 1.3) 
where the data are derived. A literature review is 
presented (section 1.4) and the aims of the study are 
elaborated (section 1.5) . In chapter two, a simple 
model is forjnulated and the total factor productivity 
of Wuhan‘s "state industry for the years 1962-92 is 
estimated. Chapter 3 concentrates on the theoretical 
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analysis of the sources of p r o d u c t i v i t y differences 
and lays the foundation for empirical estimation. In 
chapter 4, the estimation procedures are developed and 
implemented to investigate the effect of each factor 
m a k i n g u s e of firm-level panel d a t a . The convergence 
of factor returns is examined in chapter 5. The final 
chapter evaluates the effect of each factor for 
achieving higher productivity levels and draws some 
conclusions with respect to the future industrial 
d e v e l o p m e n t in China. 
1.1 The Management Structure Before 1978 
In China, state-owned enterprises employed the 
biggest share of the non-agricultural labour force and 
p r o d u c e d 70 to 80 percent of the output before 1978 
(Table 1) . At the peak {around 1964-66) , it accounted 
for 90 percent of total industrial output. On the eve 
of the reform era, the share reached 79 percent of the 
total o u t p u t . Thus, state ownership was the dominant 
type of ownership in China. Although its share has 
b e e n declining since the 1980s it still accounts for 
about 50 percent of national industrial output (Table 
1). 
To strengthen the control of state-owned 
enterprises by the central authorities, two levels of 
m a n a g e m e n t are imposed (Jackson 1992) . One level is 
enterprise management, the basis of a planned economic 
system. It is carried out by bureaucratic agencies 
which are responsible for the administration, planning 
and co-ordination of . economic activities among 
enterprises. The other is the level of factory 
management within the enterprise, for example, labour 
management and co-ordination among departments. 
.« 
： z . 
As shown in Figure 1, enterprise management is 
a hierarchical structure with the State Council at the 
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t o p . The central ministries delegate powers to the 
p r o v i n c i a l level authorities and then county-level 
a u t h o r i t i e s . The lowest level includes individual 
enterprises w h i c h operate as independent accounting 
u n i t s . Each enterprise consists of a number of 
w o r k s h o p s w h i c h in turn are made up of many work teams. 
U n d e r such a tight structure of control by the 
central a u t h o r i t i e s , politics frequently had a 
significant influence on the behavior of enterprises. 
Such a m a n a g e m e n t system empowered the state 
authorities to control capital assets as well as the 
allocation of resources, the production procedures and 
the distribution of outputs. However, central planners 
and decision makers did not have detailed information 
of individual enterprises. Besides, it was difficult 
to send information up and down the hierarchy. 
T h e r efore, it. induced enterprises to distort 
information in their favor and spend a lot of 
resources to bargain with the central authorities. As 
a result, the management system failed to direct 
resources to enterprises that valued them m o s t . 
M i s a l l o c a t i o n of resources and sectoral imbalances 
became a serious problem in China. 
A n o t h e r problem that hindered the efficiency of 
stated-owned enterprise was the soft budget constraint. 
Enterprises were not subjected to the threat of 
b a n k r u p t c y . In order to increase output to meet the 
planned targets, enterprises usually demanded more 
material inputs instead of increasing efficiency. The 
increase in the utilization of material inputs without 
considering the marginal cost led to extravagant use 
of material inputs and sluggishness in technological 
innovation. Therefore, comparing with other countries, 
more inputs , were needed to produce the same output, 
the quality of which was much worse. Technological 
progress was also much slower. 
-4 
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In v i e w of the above problems, the crux of 
post-1978 reform is the decentralization of decision-
m a k i n g p o w e r s , which in turn serves as the guiding 
p r i n c i p l e for the other associated reforms such as 
p r o f i t - s h a r i n g , and reforms to stimulate work 
incentive. 
1.2 The Post-1978 Enterprise Reform 
A l t h o u g h economic reform began in 1978, it was 
confined to the agricultural sector. New measures to 
decentralize decision making to the basic production 
units were only introduced in rural a r e a . Management 
reform of the state-owned enterprises only began on an 
experimental basis in Sichuan province in 1978. Later, 
in 1979 to 1980, the reform was also extended to other 
provinces on an experimental b a s i s . The experimental 
policies at this stage included decentralization of 
decision m a k i n g for investment, allocation and use of 
resources of the above-planned output. Various profit-
sharing schemes were introduced, for example, quota 
profit contracting (dinge lirun chengbao), 
progressive profit contracting (lirun dizeng chengbao), 
loss reduction contracting (j iankui chengbao), etc. 
W i t h the introduction of profit-sharing 
arrangements and the decentralization of investment, 
.some enterprises exercised their new investment power 
quickly. A n example in Jackson (1992) demonstrates 
the point fully: 
"The Chongqing Knitwear Factory spent all 
its enterprise fund of 60,000 yuan on 20 
badly needed new machines instead of on 
workers' quarters and b o n u s e s . . It was 
claimed that the firm recovered all its 
investments within a very short time ！ It 
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a d o p t e d a ‘snowball‘ strategy by investing 
a n o t h e r 60 new m a c h i n e s . At the end of 
1979, its profit was 530,000 y u a n . Without 
the new p o w e r s , the firm would certainly 
have to wait indefinitely for the 
a l l o c a t i o n of state-fund.” (Jackson, 1992, 
p.83) 
On the one h a n d , some aggressive enterprises, fully 
u t i l i z e d their power to make investment decisions to 
improve their profits dramatically. On the other hand, 
m a n y m a n a g e r s preferred to spend their retained 
p r o f i t s on bonus and collective welfare owing to 
p r e s s u r e from the workers. Therefore, several profit-
sharing regulations were set to ensure that a large 
share of the planned profit must be channeled into the 
p r o d u c t i o n development fund. In 19 84, the total annual 
b o n u s payments to employees were restricted to less 
than or equal two months‘ basic wages otherwise taxes 
should be p a i d . No less than 60 percent of the above-
p l a n n e d profit has to be used for production 
d e v e l o p m e n t , and no more than 40 percent could be 
spent on bonuses and non-productive construction. In 
1987, the restriction on bonus payments were adjusted: 
the tax free bonus has been raised from two months to 
four and a half months of the basic wage (Ma and Suan, 
1993) • A l t h o u g h the use of retained profit is 
subjected to the above constraints, the restrictions 
were not strictly enforced and enterprises were still 
able to manipulate funds in accordance with their own 
p r e f e r e n c e s . 
In April 1983, a new enterprise taxation system' 
commonly known as "tax-for-profit" (li gai shui) , was 
introduced. Under the new system, all large and medium 
sized state-owned profit-making enterprises had to pay 
income tax to the state, plus a proportion of the 
after-tax profits which were regarded as dividends 
-6 
p a i d to the state as the owner of the enterprises 
(Jackson 1 9 9 2 ) . The taxation system a t t e m p t e d to 
s t i m u l a t e enterprises‘ ef f i c i e n c y . T h e n , in order to 
i n c r e a s e p r o f i t , enterprises w e r e likely to improve 
t h e i r m a n a g e m e n t system and the use of their 
i n v e s t m e n t p o w e r . 
A f t e r 1984, the industrial sector entered a new 
era w i t h the introduction of n a t i o n w i d e u r b a n reforms. 
P l a n n e d p r o d u c t i o n was reduced; enterprises were 
g r a n t e d m o r e m a n a g e m e n t autonomy； wage reform 
e x p e r i m e n t s w e r e carried out to stimulate w o r k 
i n c e n t i v e . In 1986, a list of radical reform policies 
w a s p r o p o s e d . The control of factor markets was 
r e l a x e d a n d p r o d u c e r goods such as steel products were 
o p e n e d u p in m a n y p l a c e s . 
S i n c e the 80s, v o l u m e and v a r i e t y of producer 
g o o d s u n d e r the state allocation have b e e n d e c l i n i n g . 
U n d e r the d u a l - p r i c e system of introducing market 
m e c h a n i s m into the state's p l a n n i n g system, any 
surplus o v e r the planned quotas m a y be sold in the 
m a r k e t . T h u s , market prices appear side b y side with 
state p r i c e s , M a n y producers are selling m o r e and more 
of their goods through the m a r k e t rather than to the 
s t a t e . 
In 19 88, a comprehensive reform package (CMI 
model) w a s introduced (Lee, 1991). The CMI package is 
c o m p o s e d of the contract management system (CMS) ‘ the 
m a n a g e r i a l responsibility system (MRS), and the 
internal contract system (ICS)• U n d e r the reform 
p a c k a g e , m a n a g e r s acquired certain powers over the use 
of r e t a i n e d p r o f i t . They were allowed to determine 
w a g e s , b o n u s policies, and were able to offer labour 
contract w h e r e b y the enterprises were not obligated to 
p r o v i d e lifetime job tenure to the w o r k e r s . The 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e allocation of labour was also loosened. 
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In 1988, radical p r i c e reforms were carried out 
to free the prices of a wide range of commodities. 
H o w e v e r , the p r i c e reform resulted in an extremely 
h i g h inflation rate and intensified sectoral 
i m b a l a n c e s . T h e r e f o r e , in S e p t e m b e r 1988, the central 
a u t h o r i t i e s b e g a n a retrenchment p r o g r a m . The program 
intended to suppress the inflation rate to 10 percent, 
control the m o n e y supply, and reduce the sectoral 
i m b a l a n c e s , e t c . Economic readjustment led to a 
d e c l i n e in the real income for workers and tighter 
g o v e r n m e n t control over v a r i o u s economic activities. 
A f t e r the Tiananmen incident in 1989, there was 
a temporary retreat from radical reforms. The 
inflation rate fell. The p e r i o d of retrenchment did 
not last v e r y l o n g . There was a consensus among the 
Chinese Communist Party p o l i c y that the open-door 
should not be reversed. Economic reform has again 
resumed its rapid pace in recent y e a r s . 
To summarize, the reform policies have 
introduced changes into three areas: (1) the 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of decision making powers to 
enterprises together with the introduction of profit-
sharing scheme, tax-for-profit scheme and other 
contracting schemes; (2) the relaxation of factor 
m a r k e t s and the introduction of dual-price system； (3) 
reform of the wage system and job tenure. In this 
thesis, the impact of these reform measures on state-
owned enterprise will be explored. 
1,3 An Introduction to Wuhan 
Wuhan‘s state-owned enterprises are examined 
in this study. There are several ^ advantages in 
employing these data. The following section will 
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introduce W u h a n briefly and discuss the advantages of 
employing a data set of W u h a n . 
W u h a n is located at the centre of China. 
A l t h o u g h it does not have the advantages of coastal 
cities, its transportation network is rather well -
d e v e l o p e d in comparison w i t h other inland cities in 
C h i n a . It is the transportation hub of China. At the 
end of 1992, the total p o p u l a t i o n of Wuhan was 6.77 
m i l l i o n . The population density was about 725 person 
p e r square m e t e r (Wuhan Statistical yearbook, 1993). 
The industry of W u h a n is composed of a wide 
range of industrial sectors and sub-sectors. Although 
the industry is diverse, several of them are well 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The most famous industry is the steel 
i n d u s t r y . The size of the machinery industry ranks 
sixth in terms of size out of the twelve great cities 
in C h i n a . For the textile industry, a great variety of 
products have been well d e v e l o p e d . The light industry, 
chemical industry and the building material industry 
all have attained considerable scales. 
Considering the types of ownership of Wuhan‘s 
enterprises (Table 6a) , state ownership becomes 
dominant since 1956. The state industry occupied 44 
percent of the industrial output in that year. In 1992, 
state industry still accounted for more than 70 
percent of the industrial output, even though other 
types of ownership system have been officially 
a p p r o v e d . Therefore, the state-owned enterprises play 
the most important role in the economic growth of the 
city. 
Before the communist party came to power, Wuhan 
was mainly service centre due to, its strategic 
location and good transportation network (Table 6a). 
In 1949, its industrial output in 1980,s price-level 
-9 
w a s o n l y $197.66 m i l l i o n RMb3 , a n d it was m a i n l y 
c o n c e n t r a t e d in the light i n d u s t r y , e . g . , textile 
i n d u s t r y . T h e share of light i n d u s t r i a l output was 
93.5 p e r c e n t in 1949 (Table 6 b ) . A f t e r 1949, state 
o w n e r s h i p b e c a m e d o m i n a n t a n d the industrial 
d e v e l o p m e n t of W u h a n w a s u n d e r the increasing 
i n f l u e n c e of n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . For e x a m p l e , during 
the F i r s t Five Year Plan (1953-1957), the state 
a u t h o r i t i e s f a v o u r e d the d e v e l o p m e n t of h e a v y 
i n d u s t r i e s . A s a r e s u l t , W u h a n b e g a n to b u i l d a series 
of l a r g e to m e d i u m e n t e r p r i s e s in the h e a v y industrial 
s e c t o r . T h e city was t r a n s f o r m e d from a service centre 
to a n i n d u s t r i a l b a s e . In 1 9 5 7 , industrial output 
i n c r e a s e d to $1269 m i l l i o n RMB in 1980's p r i c e l e v e l , 
6.42 times that of 1949, and the share of light 
i n d u s t r i a l o u t p u t was reduced to 80 p e r c e n t . During 
the G r e a t L e a p F o r w a r d , the share of light industrial 
o u t p u t w a s f u r t h e r reduced to 52.5 p e r c e n t in 1960. 
A f t e r the C u l t u r e R e v o l u t i o n , the output of the h e a v y 
i n d u s t r y s u r p a s s e d that of the light i n d u s t r y . In 1973, 
the s h a r e of the light industry even fell to 40.9 
p e r c e n t . E v e n a f t e r 1978, the h e a v y industry in W u h a n 
is still v e r y i m p o r t a n t . The output v a l u e of h e a v y 
i n d u s t r y is h i g h e r than the light industry and the 
share of the light industry was 40 p e r c e n t in 1991 
(Table 6b) . T h e r e f o r e , the industrial development was 
h i g h l y a f f e c t e d by the p o l i c i e s of the central 
g o v e r n m e n t • 
T h e fluctuation in industrial output was 
g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by national p o l i c i e s . During the 
G r e a t L e a p Forward, the u n r e a l i s t i c targets for 
i n d u s t r i a l g r o w t h caused a sudden rise in industrial 
o u t p u t b y 54.6 percent in 1959. This k i n d of growth 
could n o t b e sustained because of its reliance on 
p o l i t i c a l m o r a l e rather than economic, incentive. In 
F ‘ 
3rMB stands for Renminbi. 
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1961, output declined by 52.6 p e r c e n t . The Third Front 
C a m p a i g n m o v e d m a n y important industries to the inner 
regions of the province, e.g., Yangxin and Xianling, 
w i t h o u t considering the economic a d v a n t a g e s . Therefore, 
the p o l i c i e s of central authorities caused violent 
fluctuations in the industrial output of Wuhan (Wuhan 
S t a t i s t i c a l B u r e a u , 1989). 
A f t e r 1978, the central government relaxed its 
control over industrial enterprises. The growth rate 
of the city's real output has been relatively stable. 
D u r i n g the reform era (1978-1992), the average annual 
g r o w t h rate of real output was 9.8 percent (Table 6b). 
Comparing w i t h other cities, the growth rate is slower 
than coastal cities but faster than inland cities. 
In M a y 1984, Wuhan was selected as a testing 
ground for comprehensive reform. Its administrative 
rank is equivalent to that of p r o v i n c e . The aim of the 
reform is to create an environment for the city to 
grow into a multi-functional economic centre for 
industry, transport, technology, finance, information, 
e t c . It was expected that the city's growth would 
bring an economic boom to the nearby regions. During 
the p e r i o d 19 86-88, 97.6 percent of large to medium 
state-owned enterprises have implemented the contract 
m a n a g e m e n t scheme in 1987 (208 out of 214 enterprises) • 
It was m u c h higher than the year 1986 when 81 
enterprises had carried out the scheme. In 19 88, the 
real growth rate of output was 13.4 percent. From 
Septeinber 19 88 to early 1990s, after the radical 
reform, the state entered a readjustment period. The 
growth rate of Wuhan‘s industry output declined. In 
199 0, the real industry output declined by 2.44 
p e r c e n t . In 1991 and 1992, the economy regained its 
energy and the real output grew by 12.4 percent and 
f» 
11.0 percent respectively. 
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A s a site for foreign d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t , W u h a n 
is n o t as a t t r a c t i v e as the c o a s t a l c i t i e s . In 1988 
a n d 1 9 8 9 , the total foreign d i r e c t i n v e s t m e n t in H u b e i 
p r o v i n c e (Wuhan is a city of H u b e i province) was 
U S $ 2 , 2 3 1 m i l l i o n and U S $ 2 , 2 9 5 m i l l i o n , a c c o u n t i n g for 
0.7 p e r c e n t of the total of C h i n a (China Statistical 
Y e a r b o o k , 1990)• The share was m u c h lower than coastal 
c i t i e s . F u j i a n a c c o u n t e d for 4 . 1 p e r c e n t in 1988 and 
10.8 p e r c e n t in 1989； S h a n g h a i ' s share was 7.3 percent 
in 1988 a n d 12.4 p e r c e n t in 1989 ； G u a n g d o n g , the 
c o a s t a l c i t y w i t h fastest g r o w t h r a t e , accounted for 
30 p e r c e n t in 1988 and 29 p e r c e n t in 1 9 8 9 . 
In v i e w of the a b o v e d i s c u s s i o n , the advantages 
of u s i n g W u h a n data are as f o l l o w s . F i r s t l y , W u h a n is 
a t y p i c a l city of China -- p o l i c i e s affecting the 
i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t of W u h a n a f f e c t other cities as 
w e l l . M o r e o v e r , W u h a n is located, at the middle of 
C h i n a , it is not as a t t r a c t i v e as coastal cities for 
f o r e i g n e r to i n v e s t . T h e r e f o r e , employing Wuhan‘s 
i n d u s t r i a l data can reduce the effect of foreign 
i n v e s t m e n t w h i c h m a y cause d r a m a t i c changes in 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
T w o sets of industrial data are employed in 
this t h e s i s ^ . The first set of data is made up of 
c i t y - l e v e l data of state-owned independent accounting 
enterprises for the year 1962-92 (Table 5). It is u s e d 
to s t u d y the overall changes in p r o d u c t i v i t y of W u h a n 
in o r d e r to have a global v i e w of the industrial 
d e v e l o p m e n t p r o c e s s . A n o t h e r set consists of 
e n t e r p r i s e - l e v e l panel data for the y e a r 1987-89 . It 
4See Appendix 1 for details of the data set. 
^Independent accounting enterprises are chosen to ensure the quality of data 
because the data.'collected are more reliable for this type of enterprises. Chen 
et al (1988) and Jefferson (1992) also use this type of data for the estimation 
of s ta te industry. 
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is u s e d to analyze the sources of productivity 
d i f f e r e n c e s among enterprises. It is to be noted that 
during the p e r i o d 1987-89, most of the large to m e d i u m 
s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises have implemented the contract 
m a n a g e m e n t s c h e m e . 
1.4 A Review of Recent Empirical Studies on the 
productivity of Chinese industry 
W h i l e m a n y studies have focused on productivity 
changes in Chinese state-owned enterprises, there is 
no consensus on the issue. Chow (1993), using annual 
data from 1952 to 1980, concludes that technological 
changes w e r e absent in 1952-80. Tidrick (1986) argues 
that the productivity stagnated in 1957-1982. On the 
other h a n d , Chen et al (1988), using data of 
independent accounting units within the state-owned 
industry and incorporating newly constructed time 
series data designed at overcoming m a j o r deficiencies 
in the figures for labour and capital, conclude that 
there was a rapid productivity growth in the state-
owned industry during First-five-year Plan (1953-1957) 
and again during the post-1978 reform period (1978-85). 
M c G u c k i n et al (1992) compare total factor 
p r o d u c t i v i t y (TFP) and its sources of growth in 39 
branches of Chinese industries for the period 1980-
1984 and 1984-1985. They conclude that TFP declined at 
an average annual rate of 1.07 percent. during 1980-
1984 and increased by 1.20 percent in 1984-1985. 
J e f f e r s o n ‘ (1992) compares productivity change for 
independent accounting units within state and 
collective owned industry during 1980-88 and indicates 
that there was an upward trend of productivity change 
in 80s. The growth rate is 2.4 percent per annum for 
state-owned industry and 4.6 percent for collective-
owned . W h e t h e r productivity has been improving after 
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r e f o r m , e s p e c i a l l y for the early reform period (1978-
84), remains u n s e t t l e d . 
C h a p t e r 3 in this thesis will analyze the trend 
of the total factor productivity of state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e . The m a i n purpose of the study is mainly to 
g e n e r a t e an overall picture of industrial development 
in W u h a n and to examine whether there is an 
improvement in p r o d u c t i v i t y . The effect of national 
p o l i c i e s w i l l also be d e s c r i b e d . 
For the sources of productivity change, 
J e f f e r s o n and Rawski (1994) argue that innovative 
activities are important if state-owned enterprises 
are to compete in the m a r k e t . In fact, township and 
v i l l a g e enterprises have a comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive low-quality products while state-
owned enterprises have a comparative advantage in the 
innovation of new products and higher quality goods. 
This is b e c a u s e wage cost is higher in state-owned 
enterprises w h i c h have to shoulder extra burden 
imposed by fringe benefits and welfare 
responsibilities assigned to state enterprises (Du and 
Shang 1993) • On the other hand, state-owned 
enterprises have a larger endowment of technical 
personnel (Table 2), In 1980, the share of technical 
personnel in the total employment of state-owned large 
and m e d i u m size enterprises have surpassed the 
collective-owned by 82.74 and 90.45 percent 
respectively (Table 2) . In the reform era, the 
disparity has been reduced. In 1990, the share for 
state-owned large and medium enterprises exceeded that 
of collective-owned enterprises by 6 and 18 percent. 
Under the pressure of competition, the state-
owned enterprises tend to increase innovation 
activities. Using enterprise-level panel data from 
1984-89 for eighty state-owned enterprises, Jefferson 
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a n d R a w s k i (1994) c o n c l u d e that c o m p e t i t i o n and low 
e a r n i n g c a u s e e n t e r p r i s e s to d e v e l o p n e w p r o d u c t s or 
cut b a c k e x i s t i n g l o s s e s . T h e r e f o r e , the R&D is a 
v i t a l f a c t o r for the s u r v i v a l of s t a t e - o w n e d 
e n t e r p r i s e s . H o w e v e r , J e f f e r s o n and R a w s k i (1994) only 
p e r f o r m e d a simple e s t i m a t i o n of the relationship 
b e t w e e n low p r o f i t and n e w p r o d u c t s . The estimated 
c o e f f i c i e n t w a s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t but the 
e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r was v e r y l o w . In chapter 4 and 5, 
t h e e f f e c t of R&D w i l l b e included, in the study w i t h 
the stock of R&D e n t e r i n g the p r o d u c t i o n function. 
W u (1993) , b a s e d on a s u r v e y conducted by the 
C h i n e s e I n d u s t r i a l I n s t i t u t e (Zhongguo Gongyue 
X u e y u a n ) , shows that w o r k e r s of d i f f e r e n t ownerships 
h a d d i f f e r e n t feelings t o w a r d s t h e i r j o b s . Their 
f e e l i n g s c o u l d d i r e c t l y a f f e c t their w o r k incentive. 
T a b l e 3a a n d T a b l e 3b report the workers‘ feeling when 
g o i n g to w o r k and the feeling at w o r k . In general, 
w o r k e r s of the foreign financed^ and township and 
v i l l a g e e n t e r p r i s e s p e r f o r m e d b e t t e r than the state 
a n d c o l l e c t i v e - o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e s . B e s i d e s , Table 3c 
shows the n u m b e r of days a w o r k e r is absent in a y e a r . 
A b s e n t e e i s m is m o r e serious a m o n g the state-owned and 
c o l l e c t i v e - o w n e d w o r k e r s than the other two types of 
e n t e r p r i s e s : the figures for the state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s - w e r e h i g h e r than township and village 
e n t e r p r i s e s and foreign financed enterprises by 34 
p e r c e n t and 17 p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y whereas the 
c o l l e c t i v e - o w n e d enterprises w e r e h i g h e r than township 
a n d v i l l a g e and foreign financed b y 40 percent and 22 
p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h e r e f o r e , it is likely that 
w o r k incentive in the s t a t e - o w n e d enterprise was lower 
t h a n that of foreign financed and township & village 
e n t e r p r i s e s . The survey only concentrated on the 
e f f e c t s of institutions (types of ownership) on work 
fore ign financed enterprises refer to the enterprises with capital owned partly or fully by 
foreign investor. 
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i n c e n t i v e . Further analysis of sources of differences 
of w o r k incentive within the same type of ownership 
w i l l b e an interesting issue. Therefore, the 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of material incentive scheme such as 
b o n u s p a y m e n t w i t h i n state-owned enterprises is w o r t h 
e x p l o r i n g 
M c G u c k i n et al (1992, 1993) use data from 
China's 1985 industrial census to evaluate the total 
factor p r o d u c t i v i t y (TFP) for 39 branches of industry 
during 1 9 8 0 - 8 5 . They show that the TFP gains are 
closely tied to the increase in retained, profits and 
the p r o p o r t i o n of total employees that are technical 
w o r k e r s , but workers‘ bonuses have a negative effect 
on T F P . H o w e v e r , Jefferson et al (1992) point out that 
the m e t h o d M c G u c k i n used requires the improbable 
a s s u m p t i o n of perfect competition in China's factor 
m a r k e t s , and several Chinese authors have obtained a 
v a r i e t y of results using similar m e t h o d (Shi et al 
1985, W a n g 1986, Zhao and Guo 1989). Using data from 
T i d r i c k and Chen (1987) , Lee (1991) concludes the 
existence of collusion among local authorities, 
m a n a g e r s and w o r k e r s . Therefore, the link between the 
reported profit and retained profit was weak. The 
amount of retained profit grew slower than the growth 
of p r o f i t reported. Besides, labour intensive 
enterprises are more successful in negotiations with 
state authorities for favorable treatments in profit 
r e m i s s i o n . He also shows that per capita bonuses in 
firms have a very weak relationship with firm 
p e r f o r m a n c e but more or less fixed in amount. Thus, 
the effects of bonus, fringe benefits and retain 
profit on raising work incentive is still a puzzle to 
be s o l v e d . 
In previous studies on sources of productivity 
differences, mostly provincial-level or national-level 
are u s e d . The estimated results may thus be biased 
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(Heathfield and W i b e , 1987)• M o r e o v e r , only the 
p r o v i n c i a l or national differences could be compared; 
it is impossible to analyze the sources of differences 
b e t w e e n e n t e r p r i s e s . In this thesis, a panel data with 
131 e n t e r p r i s e s for the y e a r 1978-89 will be used to 
a n a l y z e the sources of p r o d u c t i v i t y differences across 
e n t e r p r i s e s . The use of panel data has several 
a d v a n t a g e s . It reduces the collinearity among 
e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s , the effect of omitted variables 
a n d the p r o b l e m of inconsistency. It also provides the 
f l e x i b i l i t y to account for fixed systematic 
d i f f e r e n c e s among enterprises of different sectors 
(Hsiao, 1986) . The first-difference of the regression 
w i l l be u s e d to reduce the problem of missing 
v a r i a b l e s and m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . 
B e s i d e technical efficiency, allocative 
e f f i c i e n c y is another topic which has attracted much 
a t t e n t i o n . Jefferson (1989, 1990) and Dollar (1990) 
agree that substantial productivity gains come from 
the reallocation of resources. Xiao (1991) compares 
the total factor productivity gaps between state-owned 
a n d collective-owned enterprises using cross-city data 
of all Chinese enterprise of 1985. He concludes that 
the reform has facilitated the development of 
collective-owned enterprises which are much more 
efficient than the state-owned enterprises. The state-
owned enterprises had a more rigid allocation 
m e c h a n i s m for capital and labour. According to a 
survey on state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises 
(Zhang 1993), the management reform in state-owned 
enterprises lags behind the non-state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s . It is observed that in state-owned 
enterprises, 92.8 percent of factory managers were 
still appointed by the central authority rather than 
v o t e d in by .workers or through competition. Thus, the 
influence of the market mechanism on state industry 
was w e a k e r than the other types of ownership, and the 
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r e s t r i c t i o n s on sales prices were m u c h higher than 
other types of ownership. Jefferson et al (1992) 
compare the nominal marginal factor returns across 
state a n d collective industry revealing modest shifts 
toward convergence of the return during the early and 
later y e a r s of 1980s. The results suggest that there 
was p r o g r e s s in improving resources allocation under 
r e f o r m . The above analysis lays on different types of 
o w n e r s h i p , but in this thesis, the convergence of 
d i f f e r e n t factors will be explored. 
In chapter 5, to study allocative efficiency, 
the- n o m i n a l m a r g i n a l returns will be studied by using 
the enterprise-level data for the period 1987-89 and 
w h e t h e r there is a tendency for factor returns to 
converge w i l l be explored and the reason for their 
convergence w i l l be discussed. 
1.5 Aims of the Study 
In spite of the numerous study on the subject 
of reform and China's productivity trends, some issues 
remain controversial. With the help of a new data set, 
this thesis is an empirical investigation into some of 
these outstanding issues。 Firstly, we have to find out 
w h e t h e r economic reform has a positive impact on 
p r o d u c t i o n efficiency. Although the growth rate of 
industrial output is high in the reform period (the 
average annual growth rate of national industrial 
output was 16.8 percent from 1978 to 1992 (Table 1)), 
it does not imply that the technology or production 
methods are improving. The high growth rate may be the 
result of the increase in inputs used for production. 
This is common in the Chinese industrial sector. 
Before the reform era, Jiang and Kuan (1991) point out 
that technological advancement of the Chinese industry 
stagnated due to slow depreciation rate with the 
vintages of the technologies belonging to 50s and 60s. 
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The newly b u i l t enterprises were not employing new 
technologies or improving production method but 
duplicating the old and existing m a c h i n e s . Therefore, 
the high g r o w t h rates in the pre-reform period were 
m e r e l y the consequences of using more inputs. 
From 1978 to 1992, the state-owned enterprises 
grew at a slower rate than the collective-owned 
12.8 percent per annum compared with 21.3 percent per 
annum (Table 1) . Therefore, after the introduction of 
m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m , the share of industrial output of 
state-owned enterprises shrank from 77 percent in 1978 
to .48.1 percent in 1992 (Table 1). The declining 
m a r k e t share might be attributed to the lower 
production efficiency in state-owned enterprises. 
Jefferson et al (1992) point out that the productivity 
in collective industry grew more rapidly than state 
industry during the period 1978-88. On the other hand, 
as the m a r k e t force drives out inefficient enterprises, 
the declined output share may indicate an improvement 
in the productivity of state-owned enterprises in 
g e n e r a l . Jefferson and Rawski (1994) have argued that 
state-owned enterprises become more productive under 
the pressure of competition from the collective-owned 
enterprise. State-owned enterprises have become more 
innovative and gained a greater degree of management 
a u t o n o m y . Singh, Rathe and Xiao (1994) find that 
during 1985-91, state-owned enterprises‘ TFP rose more 
rapidly in those provinces where the share of non-
state industry output was large. 
W h e t h e r there is an improvement in productivity 
after reform is an empirical issue. To study the 
changes in productivity, an empirical study using time 
series data of Wuhan for the years 1962-92 will be 
conducted. Although the aggregate data,do not allow a 
detailed study on the performance of individual 
enterprises, they give a general picture of industrial 
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d e v e l o p m e n t and allow us to analyze the effects of 
n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s on the p r o d u c t i v i t y of state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
The next set of issues to be explored attempts 
to open the b l a c k b o x of technological advancement and 
examines such potential factors as R&D and firm size 
w h i c h account for production differences. As the 
r e f o r m stresses the decentralization of decision 
m a k i n g p o w e r to the individual enterprises and relaxes 
controls over market, there is an increasing 
c o m p e t i t i v e atmosphere b e t w e e n state-owned and 
c o l l e c t i v e - o w n e d enterprises (Jefferson and Rawski, 
1994) . Competitive pressure will induce enterprises to 
improve p r o d u c t i v i t y through technological renovation. 
T e c h n i c a l advancement in production m a y occur through 
research and development or purchase of new machines 
a n d equipment directly, Griliches and Lichtenberg 
(1984) conclude that there appears to be a rather 
strong relationship between the intensity of private 
R&D expenditures and subsequent growth in the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . Lichtenberg and Sigel (1991) use census 
longitudinal micro-data to examine the association 
b e t w e e n R&D and productivity in U S A for the period 
1 9 7 2 - 1 9 8 5 . The results confirm a positive impact of 
R&D investment on productivity. The study also shows 
that the return to company financed R&D is an 
increasing function of firm size. 
A n o t h e r important way to improve productivity 
is to increase the sophistication of management system. 
T h e r e f o r e , the impact of management reform on the 
state-owned enterprises will be analyzed. In 
p a r t i c u l a r , the effects of retained profit, bonus and 
fringe benefits on raising the incentive of workers 
and labour productivity will be explored. There is no 
consensus on the effectiveness of management reforms. 
W o n g (1989) conducts a survey of an electronics 
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factory in Shanghai and concludes that the bonus 
s y s t e m of the factory offers adequate incentives for 
the improvement of both productivity and quality. Xiao 
(1992) p o i n t s out that the use of fringe benefits in 
s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises is inefficient. Cauley and 
S a n d l e r (1992) give a negative view on this issue. 
T h e i r analysis suggests that the reforms fail to 
a d e q u a t e l y address to the workers‘ incentive problem. 
M u c h of the bonus became fixed wage supplements, not 
tied to the output or to the profit of the enterprise. 
A l t h o u g h managers of enterprises are able to 
introduce m a t e r i a l incentive scheme to workers since 
the b e g i n n i n g of the reform, Jiang and Kuan (1991) 
p o i n t out that there is a problem of collusion between 
w o r k e r s and m a n a g e r s . In China, managers are not 
strictly responsible for the losses or gains of 
e n t e r p r i s e s . Instead, managers usually represent the 
interest of workers and strive to increase benefits 
accruing to w o r k e r s . Thus, bonus may be tied neither 
to the earning of enterprises nor to the performance 
of w o r k e r s . Therefore, the effect of bonus which is 
originally used to stimulate work incentive to work 
m a y be unable to fulfill its designated function. 
A n o t h e r interesting factor to be discussed is 
the use of retained profit after reform. Although 
enterprises‘ use of retained profit was controlled by 
state regulations, the restrictions are not strictly 
enforced and enterprises are still able to manipulate 
funds in accordance with their own needs. One may 
argue that the effect of retained profit is just equal 
to the effect of bonus. In addition to bonus payments 
from retained profits, part of the retained profit may 
be u s e d for building workers, quarters and other 
fringe b e n e f i t s . If workers expect that a part of the 
retained profit is linked to their monetary return or 
other welfare such as housing, their incentive to work 
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is likely to be induced (refer to A p p e n d i x 4 for 
d e t a i l s ) . T h u s , in this thesis, the effect of retained 
p r o f i t will be studied side b y side with bonus and 
fringe b e n e f i t s . 
To study the sources of productivity 
d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n enterprises, enterprise-level data 
w i l l be e m p l o y e d . Since different enterprises 
implement the reform schedule at variable paces, these 
p r o v i d e a sufficient degree of variations in the data 
to evaluate the effectiveness of reform. The analysis 
w i l l concentrate on the impact of the R&D investment 
in technological advancement, the effectiveness of 
b o n u s , fringe benefits and retained profits on the 
labour productivity of e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Finally, this thesis will find out whether 
there is a convergence in the returns to factors and 
their relationship with the degree of openness of the 
factor m a r k e t s . Under perfect competition when 
resources are mobile, values of marginal product of 
inputs will be equalized across different firms. 
H o w e v e r , in a socialist economy, factors cannot move 
f r e e l y . Instead, the flow of factors is tightly 
controlled. W i t h the introduction of the dual price 
system and the relaxation of material markets, the 
v a l u e and variety of producer goods allocated by the 
state have b e e n decreasing. Many producers are selling 
m o r e and m o r e of their goods,through the market rather 
than to the state. As a result, the supply and the 
sale of input materials are increasingly under the 
guidance of the m a r k e t . W i t h regard to the capital 
m a r k e t , various forms of final instruments have been 
introduced and the share of state budgeted investment 
declined from 38.6 percent in 1981 to 13.2 in 1992. As 
regards the , labour market, enterprise managers have 
granted more power in choosing individual workers and 
labour contracts have been designed to break the 
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"iron-rice-bowl“. With the introduction of market 
forces, price signals help to allocate resources to 
the efficient sectors. It follows that the higher 
m o b i l i t y of factors, the greater the improvement in 
allocative efficiency. 
To summarize, the study of this thesis can be 
divided into three parts： (1) since an increase of 
output m a y not imply an improvement in productivity 
and national policies may affect the industrial 
development, Wuhan‘s productivity changes from 1962-92 
will be estimated. Through this estimation, 
enterprises‘ behaviour before and after reform can be 
compared； (2) several factors that are likely to raise 
the productivity of state-owned enterprises, e.g., R&D, 
retained profit, bonus and fringe benefits. The effect 
of each factor on productivity will be estimated. 
Besides, whether the return to R&D is an increasing 
function of firm size will be tested; (3) a 
convergence of factor returns implies an improvement 
in allocative efficiency. Thus, a simple estimation on 
factor returns will be performed to see whether there 
is a tendency to converge. 
The analysis of the productivity differences of 
state-owned enterprises allows us to assess in detail 
the degree of success of management reform and the 
convergence of factor returns demonstrates the effects 
of market liberalization. Through these studies, we 
can gain some insight into the sources of economic 
growth which is useful in predicting the future 




Chapter 2. Wuhan ^  s Industrial Productivity Changes: 
1962-1992 
In this c h a p t e r , the trend of the total factor 
p r o d u c t i v i t y of s t a t e - o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e is going to b e 
a n a l y z e d . T h e m a i n p u r p o s e of study is to give a 
g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t in W u h a n and 
a n a l y z e s the effects of n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s on Wuhan‘s 
p r o d u c t i v i t y . T h e r e f o r e , the a g g r e g a t e p r o d u c t i o n 
f u n c t i o n of W u h a n will b e e s t i m a t e d and the series of 
T F P l e v e l f r o m 1962 to 1992 w i l l b e calculated and the 
e s t i m a t e d r e s u l t will be d i s c u s s e d . 
It is clear that the rapid g r o w t h of industrial 
o u t p u t d o e s not imply an i m p r o v e m e n t in p r o d u c t i o n 
e f f i c i e n c y . T h u s , in the following sections, a 
t h e o r e t i c a l framework for a n a l y z i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y 
c h a n g e s w i l l b e laid down and a p p l i e d to state-owned 
i n d e p e n d e n t a c c o u n t i n g e n t e r p r i s e s . 
2.1 The Theoretical Framework 
In o r d e r to have an o v e r v i e w of p r o d u c t i v i t y 
c h a n g e s of Wuhan‘s st a t e - o w n e d enterprises, the 
p r o d u c t i o n function has to b e estimated first. The 
C o b b - D o u g l a s p r o d u c t i o n function is postulated"^： 
In 二 a。+ a,DBS4, + a 而 DCAF, (2 .工） 
+ cCcoMpCOMP, + In^, + InZ, • 
In equation (2.1), the subscript t denotes the 
time a n d the tth observations; K and L are capital 
s t o c k , l a b o u r and m a t e r i a l r e s p e c t i v e l y . D B 8 4 , w h i c h 
is a d u m m y to capture the fundamental changes after 
r » 
•Initially a translog production function was specified, but multicollinearity was a serious 
problem.. Thus, the translog model was simplified to the well-known Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
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reform, equals 1 for the year before 1984 and equals 
zero in and after 1984. The year 1984 is selected 
instead of 1978 because enterprises reform virtually 
b e g a n in 1984. DCAP is also a dummy and is used to 
indicate u n u s u a l slackness in the production process 
u n d e r the influence of those national policies as 
suggested by Chen (1988) « These periods are 1967-68, 
1974 and 1976-77, the industrial sector was under the 
influence of the Cultural Revolution. During the 
R e v o l u t i o n , m a n y enterprises stopped or partially 
stopped o p e r a t i o n s . The COMP denotes the index of 
competitiveness, which equals the share of output of 
collective-owned enterprises to that of state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Using equation (2.1) , the standard TFP index 
w i t h two inputs is defined as follows: 
TFP\ = exp(ln Y^-a a^ In L,) ( 2 . 2 ) 
TFP2 = exp(ln 1；— “ 而 DCAP, - a^ In 4 ) ( 2 . 3 ) 
Equation (2.2) is a traditional formulation of 
TFP while the inclusion of variable DCAP^ in equation 
(2.3) is to control the effect of slackness in 
production so that the productivity will not be 
u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . The series of total factor 
productivity are used to analyze the productivity 
change in the section 2.3. 
Equation (2.1) will be estimated using the 
state-owned independent accounting enterprises' and 
the labour L is the average number of workers employed 
in the accounting year. The capital K used here is the 
summation of deflated net production capital and 
deflated "quota working capital"8 (see,Appendix 2 for 
r • 
8The capital K is formulated as: 
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the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n net p r o d u c t i o n capital a n d 
”quota w o r k i n g c a p i t a l " ) . 
C O M P equals the share of output of collective-
o w n e d to that of state-owned e n t e r p r i s e s . B e s i d e s , the 
p r o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n will be t e s t e d for constant return 
to s c a l e a n d the r e s t r i c t i o n w i l l b e imposed if the 
test is p a s s e d . 
2.2 The Production Function Estimates 
In this chapter, e s t i m a t e d results based on 
(2.1) w i l l b e p r e s e n t e d a n d changes in TFP of W u h a n ‘ s 
s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises d u r i n g the p a s t three decades, 
1 9 6 2 - 1 9 9 2 9 , are d i s c u s s e d . 
E s t i m a t i o n results are p r e s e n t e d in Table 7. 
R e g r e s s i o n R 1 includes the s t r u c t u r a l change dummy 
(DB84), the d e g r e e of c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s (COMP) and other 
e s t i m a t e d c o e f f i c i e n t s . The D W - t e s t shows the 
e x i s t e n c e of a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n of o r d e r 1 and the common 
f a c t o r test in R2 shows the e x i s t e n c e of common factor. 
T h u s , the m o d e l has b e e n m o d i f i e d to adjust for the 
c o m m o n f a c t o r and the results are reported under R 3 . 
In R 3 , the estimates for DB84 and COMP are b o t h 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignificant. T h e s e show that there is 
Capita l Stock (K) 
=De f l a t ed Gross Fixed Production Capital x "Depreciation Index" + Deflated 
"Quota Working- Capital" 
As suggested by Chow (1993). the capital stock after 1980 has to be deflated. Therefore, 
both deflated values are calculated by adding each year's deflated investment with last 
year's capital stock. The deflated investment equals to investment divided by the price 
index. 
The Depreciation Index is the ratio of total net fixed capital io total gross fixed capital. It 
is an a p p r o x i m a t i o n Jor the capital thai is still under operat ion . , 
9only the years on and after 1962 are chosen because some data before 1962 are missing. 
With the 31 observations, it is able to generate a series of productivity level. 
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n〇 a c u t e change in economy structure after the reform 
a n d the c o m p e t i t i v e pressure still has limited effect 
on the p r o d u c t i v i t y changes. 
N e x t , the production function without DB84 and 
COMP is e s t i m a t e d and is referred to as R4 in Table 7. 
S i m i l a r to R l , the DW-test shows the existence of 
a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n of order 1 and the common factor test 
in R5 rejects the existence of common factor. The 
m o d e l c o r r e c t e d for AR (1) is R 6 , and the Durbin-H 
s t a t i s t i c also rejects the existence of 
a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n for the corrected m o d e l .工 n R6, a test 
on . constant returns to scale is p e r f o r m e d and the 
h y p o t h e s i s is a c c e p t e d . U n d e r R 7 , the model assumes 
constant r e t u r n s . The estimate of capital's output 
e l a s t i c i t y is 0.885 and the labour's output elasticity 
is 0.115 a c c o r d i n g l y . The elasticity of capital is 
h i g h e r than that of labor showing that for equal 
q u a n t i t y of inputs of both factors, the marginal value 
of capital is higher than that of labour. 
2.3 The Productivity Changes 
Estimated levels of total factor productivity 
(TFP) b a s e d on the estimates of R7 are reported in 
T a b l e 8. The TFPs in 1962 is used as the base to 
calculate the TFP level for the two series' TFPl and 
T F P 2 , The two series do not differ m u c h , only the 
series T F P l (without DCAP) has a larger fluctuation 
b e c a u s e the slackness of production is not controlled. 
The levels and changes of TFPl and TFP2 are plotted 
against time in Figure 2 - 5 . 
From the estimated results, it is revealed that 
the TFP productivity fluctuated widely before the 
reform (1978.) due to the political movements in China. 
No significant trend is discernible. Indeed, the 
average annual growth rate from 1963 to 19 78 was -
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0.216 percent for both TFPs. The year 1963 - 65 was the 
recovery period after the Great-Leap Forward； 
productivity improved. During the years of Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), the productivity fluctuated 
considerably. 
From the series of TFP, it is shown that the 
productivity from 1978 to 1983 was increasing at an 
average annual rate of 1.424 percent. From 1984 onward, 
the productivity began to grow faster. The average 
annual growth rate was 2.685 percent between 1984 and 
1988, nearly two times of the period 1978-83. 
Comparing with Jefferson (1992), which shows the 
annual growth rate of productivity of state-owned 
enterprises was 2.4 percent from 1980-88, the 
estimates of TFPs in this study also predict a growth 
rate of 2.337 percent per annum for the above period. 
Therefore, the productivity growth rate of Wuhan 
coincides with that of the State. 
Around 1978-83, several factors may offset the 
productivity growth (Tidrick 1986)• Firstly, there was 
a lack of skilled personnel in this period. During the 
Cultural Revolution, a lot of school-age students did 
not receive proper education resulting in a shortage 
of well-trained technical personnel. Even if the 
industries intended to upgrade their technologies by 
importing modern equipment, the effectiveness of this 
strategy was limited by the absorptive capacity of the 
enterprises. The advanced technology may not be 
appropriate for a labour-abundant economy. Modern 
technology may increase the capital cost greatly 
without fully utilizing the massive cheap labour force. 
Furthermore, the absorptive capacity may be limited by 
the original technical level of the enterprises. Some 
complicated , modern technologies, which cannot be 
implemented"' immediately after the purchase of new 
equipment, require past experience in similar 
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p r o d u c t i o n setting. Therefore, considerable investment 
is n e e d e d for mastering and adapting the new 
t e c h n i q u e s . Tidrick (1986) gives the following comment, 
"In general, international experience 
shows that successful upgrading of 
technology, including absorption of 
technology from abroad, depends on 
systematic improvements in technological 
capability of individual enterprises and 
specialized agencies within each country.“ 
(Tidrick, 1986, p.10) 
T h u s , at the beginning of the reform period 
(1978-83) , the lack of technical personnel aggravated 
the problems pertaining to technology advancement. 
There were insufficient well-trained personnel to take 
over the vacant positions due to retirement, thus 
Gcounting for the low productivity growth. On the 
other h a n d , the shortage stimulated enterprises to 
train more technicians and specialists to meet the 
needs of future development. Table 2 shows that the 
share of technical personnel of large to medium size 
state-owned enterprises grew at a faster rate in 1982 
and 1983. For 1982 and 1983, the growth rate of the 
large size state-owned enterprises is 12.5 percent and 
7.2 percent respectively and the medium size state-
owned enterprises was 10.6 and 13.1 respectively. 
These growth rates were higher than those in other, 
y e a r s . The large increases in technical workers in 
these years may contribute to the faster growth rate 
in productivity after the mid-eighties. 
After 1984, China experienced new waves of 
industrial reforms. The market mechanism was 
introduced ： through relaxing control over the 
allocation of resources and producer goods, delegating 
decision-making powers to individual enterprises, the 
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reducing p r i c e control, upgrading technology and 
improving m a n a g e m e n t efficiency. The enterprise reform 
a f t e r 1984 resulted in outstanding achievements. The 
a v e r a g e a n n u a l growth rate was raised to 2.685 percent 
for the p e r i o d 1984-88. In 1988, when most of the 
s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises carried out the management 
contracting scheme, the productivity growth rate 
climbed up the its peak, 7.481 p e r c e n t . 
In the late 80s, the retrenchment policies 
aimed at combating high inflation and sectoral 
imbalances led to a deep recession of the economy. The 
p r o d u c e r and consumer markets slackened considerably. 
Enterprises w h o s e inventories increased rapidly had to 
stop, or partially stop, production (Jackson, 1992). 
This caused a downward pressure on TFP since 
enterprises were producing below capacity. In 1989 and 
1990, the productivity declined by 10.1 percent and 
8.72 p e r c e n t respectively. At the beginning of 1990' 
the economy recovered and the TFP grew by 4.13 percent 
in 1991 and in 1992, the productivity level remained 
at the same level• 
From the above analysis, oscillation in TFP 
b e f o r e 1978 was much greater than the years after 
b e c a u s e the political movements before reform caused 
unstable industrial policies. With an unstable 
environment, productivity growth could not be 
s u s t a i n e d . Instead, the growth rate varied from 50.3 
percent to -33.5 percent for TFP2 (Table 8) . In fact, 
the average annual growth rate for 1963-78 was -0.216 
p e r c e n t . In comparison, the productivity growth rate 
was m o r e stable for the period 1978-83 when the 
average annual growth rate was 1.424 percent. Although 
there is still considerable fluctuation after reform, 
the amplitude is much smaller than the years before 
1978. The enterprises reform from 1984 onwards has 
brought about outstanding results. The average annual 
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g r o w t h rate was raised to 2.685 p e r c e n t . However, in 
1989, central policies intended to cool the economy, 
the g r o w t h rate declined to -10.1 p e r c e n t . Therefore, 
stable n a t i o n a l policies are important for a steady 
p r o d u c t i v i t y growth in China. 
In this section, several explanations are put 
forward to account for the productivity changes, 
h o w e v e r , due to the limitation of the time series data, 
the sources of the changes are not u n e a r t h e d . In the 
following chapters, theories of productivity changes 
w i l l be developed and enterprise-level data will be 
u s e d to find out the contribution of different factors. 
： ^ 
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Chapter 3. The Sources of Productivity Differences-
Theoretical Foundation 
This chapter and the following chapter focus 
the discussion on the sources of productivity 
differences. This chapter concentrates on the 
theoretical analysis and lays the foundation for 
empirical estimation. With the help of the theoretical 
framework, the empirical analysis will be rendered 
more precise and the link between the various factors 
and productivity can be clearly recognized. 
Factors affecting technological progress and 
incentive to work as well as the vintage effect of 
capital are discussed in this chapter. Vintage effect 
is the comparison of old and new capital effect on 
productivity. Technological progress is mainly the 
result of R&D and import of foreign advanced 
technology. Domestic economic structure and 
technological opportunities also affect technological 
changes. In the framework of production theory, 
technological opportunities can be regarded as the set 
of production possibilities for translating research 
into new techniques of production. Size of enterprise 
may also affect the amount of innovation activities. 
Detail discussion on R&D will be presented in section 
3.1. Section 3.2 will focus on workers‘ incentive to 
work which depends on the method of remuneration. 
There are several types of material returns to workers： 
bonus, fringe benefits and retained profit. Their 
effects on work incentive will be investigated. The 
vintage effect of capital will be analyzed in Section 
3.3. 
3•1 The Technological Progress 
Without doubt, one of the important factors for 
long-run industrial growth is technological progress. 
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B e f o r e the r e f o r m e r a , the i n c e n t i v e to innovate was 
low in C h i n a . I n n o v a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s o r i g i n a t e d m a i n l y 
f r o m the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s . The State P l a n n i n g 
C o m m i t t e e m a d e the i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s on R&D for the 
e n t e r p r i s e s . H o w e v e r , e n g i n e e r s m i g h t not have e n o u g h 
p o w e r or t e c h n o l o g i c a l k n o w l e d g e to carry out the 
r e s e a r c h . M o r e o v e r , if e n t e r p r i s e s attempted. to 
c o n d u c t i n n o v a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s , their p r o p o s a l s h a d to 
b e a p p r o v e d b y m o r e than 30 d e p a r t m e n t s in order to 
o b t a i n the funding (Jiang a n d G u a n , 1991). B e s i d e s , 
e n t e r p r i s e s in g e n e r a l d i d not realize the importance 
of t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n , a n d the links b e t w e e n 
r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u t e s a n d e n t e r p r i s e s were w e a k . 
T h e r e f o r e , the t e c h n o l o g i c a l level stagnated b e f o r e 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e f o r m . Jiang and G u a n (1991) 
q u o t e d a report from W o r l d Bank: "The technological 
l e v e l of C h i n e s e e n t e r p r i s e is low： 20 percent were of 
6 0 S - 7 0 S , 20-25 w e r e even w o r s e but still w o r k a b l e , the 
r e m a i n i n g 55-60 p e r c e n t m u s t b e r e p l a c e d " . In the 
r e f o r m p e r i o d , the central a u t h o r i t y has taken 
u p g r a d i n g t e c h n o l o g y as the centerpiece of its long-
t e r m i n d u s t r i a l strategy: "The stated aim is to raise 
the t e c h n o l o g i c a l level of all industry in the y e a r 
2000 to that of a d v a n c e d countries in the late 1970s 
a n d e a r l y in 1980s, raising that of some industries to 
the same level as a d v a n c e d countries at the end of the 
century" (Tidrick, 1986)• B e s i d e s , competition has 
g e n e r a t e d p r e s s u r e on s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises to 
m a x i m i z e p r o f i t s and to m i n i m i z e costs. In the 
m e a n t i m e , the p r o f i t - s h a r i n g arrangement and 
decentralization of investment p o w e r allow enterprises 
to carry out i n v e s t m e n t . T h e r e f o r e , enterprises are 
l i k e l y to carry out R&D a c c o r d i n g to their comparative 
advantages• 
To u p g r a d e t e c h n o l o g y , two strategies may be 
u s e d b y 'enterprises. One strategy is through 
i n n o v a t i o n . T e c h n o l o g i c a l opportunities to innovate 
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d e p e n d s on the availability of scientific and 
t e c h n i c a l employees, and other external sources of 
t e c h n i c a l knowledge - u n i v e r s i t i e s , government 
a g e n c i e s a n d laboratories, professional and technical 
a s s o c i a t i o n s . Enterprises have to decide the amount of 
fund to b e spent on R & D . 
The size of enterprise can affect innovation 
a c t i v i t i e s . Schumpeter (1934, 1938, 1942) put forward 
the idea that large firms have an advantage in 
g e n e r a t i n g technical advancement. M a n y researches on 
S c h u m p e t e r ' s hypothesis have been carried out, but the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between firm size and innovation is 
i n c o n c l u s i v e (Cohen and Levin, 1989) . The case for 
supporting the hypothesis is that capital market 
i m p e r f e c t i o n confers an advantage on large enterprises 
in securing finance for risky R&D project because size 
is correlated with the availability and stability of 
state r a t i o n e d or internally generated funds, In China, 
large enterprises have a higher share of state-
r a t i o n e d funds and have greater bargaining power for 
p r o j e c t funding because central authorities pay 
g r e a t e r attention to their performance. Besides, large 
enterprises usually have larger amount of retained 
p r o f i t or investment fund, which can be allocated by 
the m a n a g e r s . Another claim is that there are scale 
economies in technology of R & D . Moreover, larger 
enterprises have more technical personnel. Furthermore, 
the returns from R&D are higher when enterprises have 
a larger share of the market to spread the fixed cost 
of innovation and capture the return from innovation. 
Counter arguments suggest that the typical 
p r o b l e m s of moral hazard and free-riding exist in 
large enterprises. When the enterprises grow large, 
efficiency in R&D is undermined through loss of 
m a n a g e r i a l " c o n t r o l . The incentive 'of individual 
scientists and experts becomes attenuated as their 
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a b i l i t y to capture the benefits from their effort 
d i m i n i s h e s . One may question whether the above 
a r g u m e n t s m a y not^fapplied to socialist China. However, 
as w e are considering investment behavior under reform, 
w h e n the m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m has been introduced into the 
socialist e c o n o m y , the argument is still valid for 
a n a l y z i n g the state-owned enterprises‘ behavior. In 
this t h e s i s , whether there is a positive effect of 
enterprises‘ size on innovation, i.e., Schumpeter‘s 
h y p o t h e s i s , will be tested. 
The technological level is assumed to be A 
w h i c h is a function of the amount of R&D and the size 
of the e n t e r p r i s e , i.e., 
A = f ( TRDS, SHUBEI ) (3.1) 
w h e r e TRDS is the total R&D stock divided by sales to 
control for the size of the enterprise, and SHUBEI 
m e a s u r e s the relative size of the enterprise which 
equals the total sales of enterprises divided by their 
output of the respective sector in Hubei provinceio. 
It is u s e d to test the Schumpeter's hypothesis, i.e., 
large enterprises have an advantage in technical 
i m p r o v e m e n t . 
The second strategy for upgrading technology is 
to import advanced technology from aboard. The degree 
of improvement must depend on individual enterprises' 
capability to absorb new technology. For machines that 
10]n this paper, the total investment on R&D will be used to evaluate the 
e f fec t of R&D on increasing production efficiency. In the Chinese s t a t e -owned 
enterprises, there are two accounting i tems relating to research and 
development (R&D). One is new product testing and the other is production 
development. The.-'sum of the two items is taken as the total investment on 
R&D. For the size of s t a t e -owned enterprises, it is measured by the share of 
scale in the respect ive industry. 
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are simple to operate, the technology may be acquired 
a n d integrated into the p r o d u c t i o n process imiueciiately•. 
H o w e v e r , m o s t technology, to be fully utilized, cannot 
m a i n l y be transferred. Improvement: in productivity is 
o f t e n g a i n e d through experience in production, or 
‘learning by doing'. T h e r e f o r e , enterprises have to 
train w o r k e r s and customize the new technology to the 
s p e c i f i c needs of the individual enterprise. Katz 
(1984), referring to a research p r o g r a m on Scientific 
a n d Technological Development in Latin America, 
suggests that "the development of indigenous 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l capabilities in LDCs is a sequential 
p r o c e s s , it takes two or more decades to acquire the 
n e e d e d capabilities for a fully integrated company 
that aims at developing its own engineering strength 
in all the technical activities (from product design 
to p r o c e s s engineering, and industrial engineering).•. 
The learning sequence also calls for the use of a 
large number of engineers and technicians with 
d i f f e r e n t specialties and qualifications, including 
d e s i g n engineers, time and motion specialists, 
d r a f t s m e n , and process engineers". 
Since acquiring the needed capabilities is 
similar to improving the technology through production 
d e v e l o p m e n t , this effect may be captured by the TRDS 
in equation (3.1). Besides, the improvement in 
technological level through direct purchase of new 
capital can be reflected as lowering capital cost and 
w i l l be treated by the vintage effect on capital to be 
d i s c u s s e d in section 3.3. 
3.2 The Incentive to Work 
W h e t h e r there is an improvement in labour 
productivity, through increasing work incentive of 
workers under the reform is a controversial issue. 
M a n y studies argue that Chinese enterprises 
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distributed material rewards equally among workers and 
thus failed to raise work incentive (Xiao, 1992, 
Cauley and Sandler, 1992). Only a few economists adopt 
a positive v i e w on this issue (Wong, 1989) , Among 
Chinese enterprises, there are two types of material 
returns other than wage： bonus and fringe benefits, 
M o r e o v e r , retained profit, which may be partly 
transferred to workers as monetary return or other 
welfare such as housing, can play an important role in 
workers‘ beh a v i o r . 
3.2.1 The Bonus Payment 
In the last quarter of 1983, wage adjustments 
occurred in industrial enterprises which were granted 
more management autonomy under the enterprise reform 
(Jackson, 1992)• The adjustments were intended to link 
workers‘ payoff to their efforts. Thus, enterprises 
that were losing money had to become profitable before 
they were allowed to adjust wages upward. A kind of 
non-tenure promotion called the ‘floating grade 
promotion' method provided some flexibility in 
promotion arrangement. Workers would be promoted if 
their performance was good, otherwise they might be 
demoted. 
In addition, bonus payment has become a major 
component of individual‘s total wage package after 
reform. Table 9 reports the structure of total wage. 
The portion of bonus and subsidies increased 
substantially since the reform. In 1979, their share 
in total wage increased from 8.8 percent to 16.3 
percent, nearly two times that of 1978. In 1992, their 
share reached historical height of 43.8 percent, 
nearly half of the total wage. However, it is 
frequently argued that the link bety^een bonus and 
performance is not strong. Jiang and Kwan (1991) and 
Jackson (1992) argue that the ineffectiveness of 
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linking p a y m e n t with p e r f o r m a n c e is due to the 
b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r of labour. The strong bargaining 
p o w e r of w o r k e r s was supported by the permanent 
e m p l o y m e n t s y s t e m , and the n o n - e x i s t e n c e of the threat 
of b a n k r u p t c y of enterprises. Since managers did not 
h a v e the right to fire workers, the typical managerial 
s t r a t e g y w o u l d be one of indulgence towards w o r k e r s . 
In o r d e r to w i n their co-operation, strategy such as 
the m a x i m i z a t i o n of bonus and other material benefit 
a n d the m i n i m i z a t i o n of conflicts are employed. 
M a n a g e r s h a v e to be well aware of workers ‘ 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n because of the difficulty of sacking 
w o r k e r s . As a result, some m a n a g e r s were forced by-
w o r k e r s to release bonus even though the enterprises 
w e r e s u f f e r i n g from losses. A n example cited by 
J a c k s o n (1992) is as follows: 
”some of the 100 firms in Sichuan reform 
experiment disobeyed the regulation that 
b o n u s e s per year should be restricted to 
two m o n t h s of basic w a g e s . They often 
c o m p a r e d bonuses amongst themselves and 
p u s h e d payment higher and higher, and 
w h e n those incurring heavy losses were 
a l s o reckless in issuing b o n u s e s . One 
common way to acquire the m o n e y to pay 
for bonuses was to enter prices in the 
a c c o u n t s as being much lower than those 
at w h i c h goods were sold to minimize 
taxes； another was the diversion of 
p r o d u c t i o n funds to their bonus fund.” 
(Jackson, 1992, p.171) 
L a t e r in April 1984, the State Council 
a n n o u n c e d a new bonus tax to restrict the excessive 
rise in bontis. However, managers couXd maximize the 
r • 
b o n u s fund in various ways either legally or illegally. 
T h e r e f o r e , bonus may be linked neither to the profit 
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of the enterprise nor to the effort of each individual, 
and is thus unable to raise the work incentive. 
3 >2.2 The Retained Profit 
In the past, profits earned by state-owned 
enterprises should be handed over to the state, in 
return, funding needed and the losses incurred by them 
were distributed and covered by the state, Managers 
had v e r y little financial power and enterprises were 
not motivated to earn much profit. During the initial 
phase of enterprise reform (1978-84), various profit-
sharing schemes were applied to state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s . They were： (1) the Enterprise Fund System 
for a small number of state-owned enterprise; (2) the 
profit or loss contracting system for those 
enterprises which were earning very little profits or 
incurring losses, and (3) the profit retention system 
for the profit making enterprise. Therefore, 
enterprises are allowed to retain a part of their 
profits under reform and the use of this profit can be 
determined by the managers. Usually, a portion of the 
retained profit is distributed as bonuses and/or used 
for building quarters for workers, etc. The workers‘ 
return is thus indirectly linked with the performance 
of enterprises. Under the new arrangements, workers 
are expected to work harder in order to maximize their 
return. A simple model of this relationship between 
payment schedule and the incentive to work of a 
typical worker is illustrated in Appendix 4. It shows 
that the' effort level paid for the worker is 
positively related to the share of output. Even when 
there is environmental noise, workers‘ output is still 
related to their effort. Therefore, since the retained 
profit links the return of workers to their effort, it 
is likely t a raise the work i n c e n t i v e . . 
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W h e n t e a m w o r k is c o n s i d e r e d , there are two 
c o u n t e r a c t i n g e f f e c t s . One is the free-rider's problem： 
s i n c e e a c h w o r k e r ' s effort is d i l u t e d by the group 
e f f e c t , w o r k e r s tend to s h i r k . On the other h a n d , 
t h e r e is the effect of self -monitoring ： as workers ‘ 
ret u r n s are i n t e r r e l a t e d , if a w o r k e r is shirking, 
o t h e r w o r k e r s h a v e the incentive to p u s h him to w o r k 
h a r d e r . T h e r e f o r e , the effect of team work is 
a m b i g u o u s . 
B e f o r e specifying the relationships of w o r k 
i n c e n t i v e w i t h the retained p r o f i t , bonus and fringe 
b e n e f i t s , the d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n them have to be 
d i s c u s s e d . A l t h o u g h bonus m a y come from the retained 
p r o f i t , their relationship is not strong (see table 10 
for their c o r r e l a t i o n ) , In fact, b o n u s is subjected to 
an u p p e r b o u n d - the total a n n u a l bonus payments are 
n o t to e x c e e d an amount equivalent two months ‘ basic 
w a g e . B e s i d e s , w h e n profit is l o w e r e d , workers may not 
b e w i l l i n g to accept a lower b o n u s . Bonus may be 
bi. 
m a x i m i z e d in different ways and m a y not； linked to the 
p e r f o r m a n c e of the e n t e r p r i s e s . But for the retained 
p r o f i t , w h e n the enterprise earns m u c h , she can 
d i s t r i b u t e a p o r t i o n of the p r o f i t to workers through 
b o n u s a n d / o r other n o n - m o n e t a r y return, such as 
h o u s i n g and free gifts； to raise the moral of w o r k e r s . 
W h e n e n t e r p r i s e s are losing m o n e y , the non-monetary 
r e t u r n can be cut off e a s i l y . T h e r e f o r e , the retained 
p r o f i t can capture the returns to worker better than 
bonus• 
F i n a l l y , fringe b e n e f i t s are another 
m e a s u r e m e n t for the return to w o r k e r s and are included 
in the e s t i m a t i o n to see if it has any influence on 
the incentive to w o r k . « 
- < 
in the final a n a l y s i s , whether the work 
incentive depends on retained p r o f i t , bonus and/or 
“ 40 
fringe benefits is an empirical problem. The incentive 
function (I)〇f a worker is formulated as： 
工 = f ( RTPL, BONL, FWL ) (3.2) 
where RTPL, BONL, and FWL are per worker retained 
p r o f i t , bonus, and fringe benefit and welfare 
respectively. The effective labour input, L*, becomes： 
f {RTPL, BONL, FWL) 
where L is the observed units of labour. 
3.3 The Vintage Adjustment on Capital 
The vintage of capital has two counteracting 
effects on productivity. One is the effect of 
inflation. Since the productive capital stock is the 
summation of previous investments in current prices' 
the problem of inflation should be addressed. 
Inflation tends to raise up the cost of new capital. 
For each dollar of capital, old capital will be more 
productive. The counteracting effects pertain to the 
technological improvement, As the technological level 
improves over time, new capital may be more productive. 
In order to take the above two effects into 
account, Jefferson"s (1992) method is followed and a 
vintage factor is attached to the capital stock, then 
the adjusted productive capital stock becomes: 
K* = K exp ( e VINT ) (3.3) 
where VINT i's the vintage factor, and is equal to the 
ratio of net capital stock to gross capital stock. If 
the inflation rate for capital goods is high, new 
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c a p i t a l w i l l b e m o r e costly, then 9 wi l l be n e g a t i v e 
a n d K w i l l b e dis c o u n t e d b y the v i n t a g e e f f e c t . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t e c h n o l o g i c a l i m p r o v e m e n t embodies in 
ne w c a p i t a l m a y c o u n t e r a c t the e f f e c t of i n f l a t i o n . If 
n e w c a p i t a l i n c r e a s e s p r o d u c t i v i t y s u b s t a n t i a l l y , 0 
wi l l b e p o s i t i v e and K* will b e g r e a t e r . T h e r e f o r e , 6 
cap t u r e s the r e l a t i v e size of b o t h e f f e c t s . 
3.4 The Refined Production Function 
S i n c e this chapter focuses on the sources of 
pr o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s , a pr o d u c t i o n function should 
b e f o r m u l a t e d f i r s t . The f o r m u l a t i o n , w h i c h involves 
l o t s of ex p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s o t h e r than such b a s i c 
i n p u t s as cap i t a l , labour and m a t e r i a l have b e e n 
s k e t c h e d p r e v i o u s l y . In ad d i t i o n , the analysis b y 
ind u s t r i a l sectors expands the v a r i a b l e s several t i m e s . 
T h e r e f o r e , to avo i d c o m p l i c a t i o n s in mod e l i n g , a 
sim p l e C o b b - D o u g l a s p r o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n is employed as 
followsii: 
(3.4) 
w h e r e i=l,•..,7, 
j = l , … 1 3 1 , 
t:=l,2,3. 
i, j, a n d t deno t e the number of s e c t o r s , number of 
o b s e r v a t i o n s a n d time r e s p e c t i v e l y . The seven sectors 
are： (1) textile industry; (2) light industry 
(including paper-making & pap e r p r o d u c t s , and chemical 
fibers)； (3) mach i n e r y industry； (4) transport 
e q u i p m e n t industry; ( 5 )』l e c t r o n i c industry; (6) 
bui l d i n g m a t e r i a l 工ndustry^"(7) chemical industry.八土 
is the t e c h n o l o g i c a l level as in equation (3.1), 
K . • h* is the effective capital stock/- Lij ^ t* is the 
l l j n this model, effective capital, K*. and labour, lA are used instead of the normal inputs 
to include the latent factors that affect the quality of K and L. 
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e f f e c t i v e l a b o u r input a n d Mj_j ^  ^  is the d e f l a t e d 
m a t e r i a l i n p u t s . F a c t o r output e l a s t i c i t i e s are 
a s s u m e d to b e c o n s t a n t w i t h i n each s e c t o r , across all 
o b s e r v a t i o n a n d t h r o u g h the p e r i o d b e i n g s t u d i e d . 
F r o m e q u a t i o n (3.1), A in (3.4) is a function 
of R & D s t o c k a n d the relative size of e n t e r p r i s e . T 8 8 , 
T89 a n d RTPO a r e further a d d e d to the e q u a t i o n and the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p b e c o m e s : 
(3.5) 
TRDS , = y w.^RDS , . , m e a s u r e s the a c c u m u l a t e d research 
ij yt 伙 y，卜欠 
k 
a n d d e v e l o p m e n t fund (the stock of R&D)； it is divided 
b y sales v a l u e to control for the size of the 
e n t e r p r i s e . RDS^j, m e a s u r e s the gross investment in the 
rScD in p e r i o d t and connect the level of past 
r e s e a r c h to the current stage of k n o w l e d g e . This 
m e t h o d is b o r r o w e d from G r i l i c h e s (1986), who relates 
i n n o v a t i o n to the stock of k n o w l e d g e . In this thesis, 
R & D s t o c k is u s e d as the stock of k n o w l e d g e . 
T8 8 and T89 are time dummies to m e a s u r e the 
t e c h n i c a l shocks for the years T88 and T 8 9 , e.g., the 
c h a n g e in the national p o l i c i e s . B e s i d e s , enterprises 
w i t h o u t r e t a i n e d profit m a y b e b a c k w a r d enterprises 
a n d RTPO is u s e d to capture this e f f e c t . SHUBEI 
m e a s u r e s the relative size of an e n t e r p r i s e . It is the 
r a t i o of the enterprise's total sale v a l u e to its 
r e s p e c t i v e sector's total output of H u b e i . 
T h e effective capital stock Kij't* is derived * 




w h e r e is the total p r o d u c t i v e capital stock, w h i c h 
is e q u a l to the s u m m a t i o n of net p r o d u c t i o n capital 
a n d q u o t a w o r k capital (see A p p e n d i x 2) . VINT.、 
y，r 
m e a s u r e s the v i n t a g e effect on capital stock and is 
d e f i n e d as the ratio of net capital stock to gross 
c a p i t a l s t o c k . 
In v i e w of e q u a t i o n (3.2), the effective 
l a b o u r u n i t is refined as: 
y.f v’t (3 7 ) 
w h e r e I..^  is the average n u m b e r of w o r k e r employed. /..^  
m e a s u r e s the incentive effect of the v a l u e of retained 
p r o f i t p e r w o r k e r (RTPL), the b o n u s p a y m e n t p e r w o r k e r 
( B O N D a n d the fringe b e n e f i t p e r w o r k e r (FWL) . To 
s i m p l i f y the e s t i m a t i o n , linear relationship is 
a s s u m e d for the v a r i a b l e s inside the exponential part 
of the f u n c t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , M is the d e f l a t e d m a t e r i a l input and 
is equal to the gross p r o d u c t i v e m a t e r i a l deflated b y 
e a c h s e c t o r ' s m a t e r i a l inflation indexi2 • 
C o m b i n i n g equations (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) and 
(3.7), w e g e t , 
…. . . - • - - -
12Maienal inflation'index is calculated by the weighted average of the percentage increase 
in the cost of material input due to inflation for the enterprises of same sectors. From the 
series of average percentage increase in cost, each sector's inflation indexes are generated 
with 1987 being the base year. 
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= e x p ( a 。 ^ a . R T P O ^ . , -^a.JRDS^., 
.VINT』'仏’,_\iRTI%” . M”: 
=exp(ao +a 飞RTP\t + 以 + a,,SHUBEI 
+ aA Vm” +队RT�t —PAfiONLi3，t 
(3.8) 
T h i s is the refined p r o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n and it will be 
e s t i m a t e d in the following c h a p t e r . 
r » 
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Chapter 4 • The Sources of Productivity Differences 
-Empirical Analysis 
T o a n a l y z e the sources of p r o d u c t i v i t y 
d i f f e r e n c e s e m p i r i c a l l y , the e n t e r p r i s e - l e v e l p a n e l 
d a t a a r e u s e d (see A p p e n d i x 1) . The e n t e r p r i s e - l e v e l 
p a n e l d a t a r e d u c e s the p r o b l e m of c o l l i n e a r i t y a n d 
o m i t t e d v a r i a b l e s , and p r o v i d e s the flexibility to 
a c c o u n t for the d i f f e r e n c e s among e n t e r p r i s e s as w e l l 
s e c t o r s . 
4.1 The Estimation Procedure 
T o e n s u r e the q u a l i t y of e s t i m a t i o n , 
o b s e r v a t i o n s in each e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e in each 
s e c t o r a r e p l o t t e d against the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s to 
c h e c k for o u t l i e r s . Outliers are d r o p p e d b e f o r e 
e s t i m a t i o n to a v o i d b i a s e d result^^. 
N e x t , to study sectoral d i f f e r e n c e s using the 
e n t e r p r i s e - l e v e l panel data set, sectoral dummies are 
a t t a c h e d to e a c h e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e for every s e c t o r . 
U s i n g s e c t o r a l durnmies is b e t t e r than analyzing each 
s e c t o r i n d e p e n d e n t l y b e c a u s e the degrees of freedom 
i n c r e a s e c o n s i d e r a b l y and sectoral and overall 
e f f e c t s m a y b e analyzed s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . W h e n v a r i a b l e s 
i n f l u e n c e e a c h sector d i f f e r e n t l y , sectoral dummies 
w i l l b e u s e d to give sector-specif ic e f f e c t s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , if the general p e r f o r m a n c e of the w h o l e 
i n d u s t r y is to be e s t i m a t e d , no sectoral dummies are 
r e q u i r e d . 
« 
13]t is observed that different sectors have different mean level for each variable, and the 
ranee are also different. Appendix 5a records the mean value, variance maximum and 
mTmmum for each variable m each sector. After the deletion of o u t l i e r s the statistics are 
listed in appendix 5b. The total number of observation reduced from 393 to J54. 
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F o r a t h r e e - f a c t o r inputs m o d e l , w i t h 7 sectors 
a n d 393 o b s e r v a t i o n s , the e s t i m a t i o n e q u a t i o n w i l l 
bei4： 
Inl；.^  - a , 〜•‘+!： aJHUBEI”.’, 
i i 
+ X a,《VINT”’t + X fiARTPLiu + Z A4召OA/L仏,+ ^  A A ? 肌 
i i z i 
+ Z 议z In 〜，,+ YA In Ay, + Z 广 lnM^“ + 〜，， 
i i i 
(4.1) 
w h e r e i=l,•.•,7; 
] = 1 / • • • , 1 3 1 , 
t = l , 2 , 3 . 
i d e n o t e s the s e c t o r to w h i c h o b s e r v a t i o n j belongs 
a n d t d e n o t e s the t i m e . O n l y three v a r i a b l e s are u s e d 
to c a p t u r e the effect of the w h o l e i n d u s t r y . They are 
T88 , T89 a n d R T P O . T88 and T89 are u s e d to find out 
the g e n e r a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l level for y e a r 1988 and 1 9 8 9 . 
RTPO is u s e d to estimate the g e n e r a l b e h a v i o u r of 
e n t e r p r i s e s w i t h o u t retained p r o f i t . The coefficients 
of the O t h e r v a r i a b l e s are e s t i m a t e d for the sector-
s p e c i f i c e f f e c t s . 
S i n c e the time span of 1987-89 is short, then 
the stock of e f f e c t i v e R&Di5, TRDSy^ m a y be w r i t t e n as 
14por the constant term, we considered the case that different sectors are different 
initially. Then, the data support the test of same constant terms and thus, we model the 
equation (10) with aQ only. 
For the error term, asymptotic normal are assumed to ensure the validity of 
the tests. ： 一 
15As the analysis stresses on the R&D being induced under the reform, the stock of R&D 
before the radical reform (1987) is assumed to be negligible because most R&D were 
generated according to the state plan. 
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TRDS^j , •ij、t-k ‘ k= 0,1, 2 and : 1 • Thus' the 




Since the R&D spent is measured in current value, the 
effect of inflation may make w^. and w^. greater than 
one because the purchasing power of a dollar will be 
greater in past years than current y e a r . Alternatively, 
the recent spending on R&D is more likely to induce 
p r o d u c t i v i t y advancement implying w^. and w^i may be 
less than o n e . Therefore, an F-test will be performed, 
i.e., a,, 二 丨 ： 丨 ， f o r all to deduce whether the 
weight for the time span is equal. If the test accepts 
the null hypothesis showing that each year's 
investment has some effect on current innovation 
w i t h i n such a short time span, then TRDS^j, will be 
equal to the sum of RDS in these three years. 
Substituting equation (4.2) back to equation 
(4.1), 
i 
+ 声〜—2) + !： asiSHUBEIij’,！^ 缺嗎腿"’， 
i I ‘ 
+ y 队观"，,+1>风,+A/，,+!>'•"’£ 
z ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 
(4.3) 
p_test will be performed to analyze the joint 
sectors' significance for each explanatory variable. 
Variables which are statistically insignificant will 
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b e d e l e t e d a n d the p r o d u c t i o n f u n c t i o n will be 
e s t i m a t e d a g a i n . F i n a l l y the p r o d u c t i o n function 
e s t i m a t e s w i l l be o b t a i n e d w i t h the e x p l a n a t o r y 
v a r i a b l e s b e i n g j o i n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 
In o r d e r to further v e r i f y the s t r e n g t h of the 
e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r for each v a r i a b l e , and reduce the 
p r o b l e m of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y and m i s s i n g v a r i a b l e s , 
the f i r s t - d i f f e r e n c e of the p r o d u c t i o n function will 
b e p e r f o r m e d ^ ^ , i . e . 
(In-InYJ = � , - 動 1 ) + Z [SHUBEI,., -SHUBEI^”―、) 
i I 
i i 
+ z PAi、BONLij’t - BONLi】’t-\) + Z 队[FWL,, 一 FWL,,-^) 
i ‘ 
+ X 仅 , ( i n K 似 - I n K ” 、 t - \ ) + ( I n L, , - In ) + ； ^ , , (In M叫 
I I ’ 
(4.4) 
4.2 The Empirical Results 
A s p r e l u d e to the e s t i m a t i o n of equations (4 .？ ) 
a n d (4.4), the correlation coefficients of R T P L , BONL 
a n d FWL w i l l be first g e n e r a t e d to check for the 
e x i s t e n c e of m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y b e c a u s e these three 
v a r i a b l e s m a y be highly c o r r e l a t e d . 
A s shown in Table 10, the a u x i l i a r y regressions 
b e t w e e n R T P L , FWL and BONL show no strong correlations 
« 
16The lime dummy A T89 is absent in the first difference equation because estimates of 
T88 and T89 are statistically insignificant, whereas deletion of the term ARTPO is because 
of the small variation. 
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a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . T h e r e f o r e , the p r o b l e m of 
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s is not s e r i o u s . 
In o r d e r to m e a s u r e each v a r i a b l e ' s e x p l a n a t o r y 
p o w e r , e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s h a v e b e e n regressed w i t h 
the i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s e p a r a t e l y . Each R - s q u a r e 
g i v e s the m a x i m u m e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r of each v a r i a b l e 
a n d the F - s t a t i s t i c tests the s i g n i f i c a n c e . This 
p r o c e d u r e is to ensure that each independent v a r i a b l e 
h a s a p o t e n t i a l p o w e r to e x p l a i n the v a r i a t i o n of the 
d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e L N Y . The r e s u l t s are summarized in 
Table: 11a a n d l i b . It is o b s e r v e d that w h e n total 
p r o d u c t i v e stock is u s e d , e s t i m a t e s of capital in R 1 
a r e s i g n i f i c a n t (refer to A p p e n d i x 2 for the details 
of total p r o d u c t i v e s t o c k ) , H o w e v e r , w h e n we separate 
the total p r o d u c t i v e capital stock into fixed capital 
s t o c k a n d w o r k capital s t o c k , there is a p r o b l e m of 
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y in R2 (Table lib) . The estimates of 
f i x e d c a p i t a l stock b e c o m e s insignificant and the 
s i g n s of the e s t i m a t e s are d i f f i c u l t to explain. T h u s , 
w e u s e total p r o d u c t i v e capital stock rather than 
t r e a t i n g the two d i f f e r e n t types of capital stock 
d i f f e r e n t l y . 
S i n c e all e x p l a n a t o r y variables are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant in individual regression, 
a l l the e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s in equation (4.3) are 
r e t a i n e d . 
The p r o d u c t i o n function in equation (4.3) is 
e s t i m a t e d . The result is reported in Table 12a. From 
the T a b l e , the F-test accepts the null hypothesis that 
the v a l u e of R&D spending is of equal weight in each 
i e -n w -aw / for all i. The restriction y e a r , i. ^  . a^. _ a^^w^^ 一 a^^ w^ j ‘ 
“ 一 … ， 一 “ w reduces the p r o d u c t i o n function to 
equation (4.1) with TRDS』=RDS』,+ RDS』卜、RDS 
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The estimated coefficients for equation (4.1) 
a r e r e p o r t e d in Table 12b, The result shows that both 
e s t i m a t e d coefficients for BONL and FWL are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignificant. Therefore, BONL and FWL 
are d i s p o s e d , and the production function is estimated 
a g a i n . 
W i t h o u t BONL and FWL, the estimated results in 
T a b l e 12c show that the joint tests on each 
e x p l a n a t o r y variable over all sectors are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant at 5 percent level and 
a c c e p t the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
a r e g r e a t e r than zero. Therefore, the explanatory 
v a r i a b l e s (TRDS, SHUBEI, V I N T , RTPL and the three 
inputs) have a positive impact on the output Y . The 
following discussion on each variable will base on the 
e s t i m a t e d results in Table 12c. 
The estimated constant term is 1.1046 and the 
c o e f f i c i e n t s for T88 and T89 are 0.0433 and 0.00005 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Therefore, the technological level in 
1988 was increased by 3.92 percent but declined by 
3.77 p e r c e n t in 1989. Above all, both the increase and 
d e c r e a s e are statistically insignificant. 
The estimate of RTPO is -0.1503 and is 
statistically significant. It shows that enterprises 
w i t h o u t retained profit belong to a lower productivity 
g r o u p . 
The estimates of stock of R&D (TRDS) vary from 
-2.1287 to 2.0201. Although four out of seven sectors 
have negative sign, the joint test over all sectors 
accepts the hypothesis that the estimates are positive 
at 5 percent level of significant. Therefore, R&D in 
general has a positive effect on production efficiency 
b u t m a y v a r y across different industrial sector, 
industries that have positive estimates are light 
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i n d u s t r y , electronic industry and building material 
i n d u s t r y . Those with negative estimates are textile, 
m a c h i n e r y , transport and chemical industry. Only the 
e s t i m a t e s of the last two industries are statistically 
s i g n i f i c a n t . 
For the estimated coefficients for size effect 
(SHUBEI), they rang from -7,9678 to 26.3062. Four out 
of seven sectors have positive signs and the joint 
test over all sectors accepts the hypothesis that the 
estimates are positive at 1 percent level of 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . Negative estimates are found in light, 
m a c h i n e r y and electronic industry, while positive 
estimates are found in to textile, transport, building 
m a t e r i a l and chemical industry. Only the estimates of 
m a c h i n e r y and electronic industry are statistically 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 
For the vintage effect (VINT) , its 
estimates v a r y from -0.0357 to 0.3509, only textile 
industry gives a negative coefficient which is 
statistically insignificant. The joint test that the 
estimated coefficients are positive for all sectors is 
a c c e p t e d at 1 percent level of significant showing 
that newly purchased capital goods are more productive 
for the same v a l u e . 
For retained profit per worker (RTPL) , only 
electronic and chemical industry shows a negative 
impact on productivity, but they are statistically 
insignificant and the value is relatively s m a l l , -
0.0021 and -0.0025 respectively. Other estimates vary 
from 0.0481 to 1.981. The joint test has accepted the 
hypothesis of positive coefficients for all sectors at 
1 percent level of significance. 
Finally, the most familiar inputs: capital, 
labour and material are going to be discussed. All of 
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the estimates for elasticity of inputs are positive as 
expe c t e d and most are statistically significant. For 
the el a s t i c i t y of capital, only textile industry is 
comp a r a t i v e l y lower than other industries and is 
stat i s t i c a l l y insignificant, others ranging from 
0.1952 to 0.5388. The insignificance of estimate in 
textile industry m a y be due to the problem of low 
dep r e c i a t i o n rate in book v a l u e . For labour, the 
elast i c i t i e s are low in textile and chemical industry, 
0.0337 and 0.0762 respectively, while others vary from 
0.1427 to 0.5702. In Chinese industry, compulsory 
employment is a common p r a c t i c e , thus, it is likely 
that the elasticity of labour is lower than western 
c o u n t r i e s . For material input, the elasticity is 
relati v e l y higher than other inputs and varying from 
0.1615 to 0.8171. Only the building material industry 
has a low and insignificant estimate. This m ay be 
attr i b u t i v e to the hoarding of materials which weakens 
the correlation between material purchases and outputs. 
To alleviate the problem of m u l t i col linear it:yi7 
and m i s s i n g variables, and check the explanatory power 
of each variable, the first-difference production 
function is estimated. From Table 13a, the estimates 
of A L N L , A V I N T , A R T P L and A S H U B E I , are all 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the regression 
excluding the variables A V I N T , A R T P L and AS H U B E I is 
perf o r m e d again and the result is summarized in Table 
1 3 b . 
Examining the estimates of TRDS in Table 13b, 
only building material industry has a negative impact 
on changes in output (AlnY) and is statistically 
insignificance* In general, the estimated coefficients 
1 "^Although the .auxiliary regressions of the variables in Table 
12C (r^fer to-'table 14a)' LNK' LNL , LNM and VINT are highly 
correlated, the first-difference of the production function c ^ 
reducr thUr corrlation. The auxiliary regressions of the 
variSles in Table 13 (refer to table I4b) ' shows no strong 
c o r r e l a t i o n among t h e above 4 variables. 
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are p o s i t i v e and pass the joint-test at 5 percent 
level of s i g n i f i c a n t . These enforce the power of R&D 
on p r o d u c t i v i t y improvement. 
For the three typical inputs in Table 13b, the 
e l a s t i c i t y of capital increases greatly, varying from 
0.4085 to 1.1741. In comparison with the level 
e s t i m a t e s , w h i c h vary from 0,0911 to 0.5388, it shows 
that the changes in log capital value have a 
r e l a t i v e l y h i g h impact on the change of output. This 
implies that the increased new investment is more 
p r o d u c t i v e than the average capital. It is also 
observed, that all estimated elasticities of labour are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y insignificant, and some of them are even 
n e g a t i v e . This can be explained by the fact that those 
u n w a n t e d w o r k e r s who are assigned to work in the 
e n t e r p r i s e s by central authorities are less productive 
and m o t i v a t e d . These workers do not increase the 
o u t p u t , For the elasticity of material, although it is 
quite h i g h in level, it is relatively low in first-
d i f f e r e n c e estimation. It range from 0.0116 to 0.3966. 
It is b e c a u s e enterprises may hoard materials so that 
a large increase in material inputs may not be used in 
p r o d u c t i o n . Therefore, a high increase in inputs does 
not raise output significantly. This phenomenon is 
m o s t serious in textile industry, its estimated 
elasticities decline from 0。8325 to 0.0116. 
4,3 Discussions on Sources of Productivity Difference 
Firstly, the time dummies which are used to 
capture external shocks leading to changes in 
p r o d u c t i o n efficiency. The estimated coefficient for 
T88 is 0.0433 and T89 is 0.00005. It means that 
Wuhan‘s industry had an overall improvement in its 
total factor productivity (TFP) by 3^.92 percent in 
1988 but had a reduction by 3.77 percent in 1989. 
These m a y be explained by national policies. 
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B e f o r e the m i d - 1 9 8 8 , i n d u s t r i a l reforms w e r e 
c o n c e n t r a t e d on the e n t e r p r i s e level and e n t e r p r i s e s 
s e a r c h e d for their m o s t s u i t a b l e m o d e of o p e r a t i o n . 
T h e r e f o r e , the TFP w e r e i m p r o v i n g . H s u e h and W o o (1991) 
c o n c l u d e t h a t , "industrial i n s t i t u t i o n r e f o r m d u r i n g 
1 9 8 6 - 8 7 w e r e d i r e c t e d m a i n l y at m i c r o l e v e l , such as 
e x p e r i m e n t s on the issue of shares and s t o c k s , 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n of ‘Cheng-bao‘, gra n t i n g g r e a t e r 
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o w e r to e n t e r p r i s e m a n a g e r s , m e r g i n g 
e n t e r p r i s e into corporate groups and d i s s o l v i n g 
i n e f f i c i e n t e n t e r p r i s e , open b i n d i n g and lease of 
s m a l l e n t e r p r i s e s , etc。" （p.100-101) 
L a t e r in 19 88, the central g o v e r n m e n t carried 
out c o m p r e h e n s i v e p r i c e reforms w h i c h a l l o w e d free 
f l o a t i n g of p r i c e s for a w i d e range of c o m m o d i t i e s . 
H s u e h a n d W o o (1991) p o i n t out that a l t h o u g h the p r i c e 
r e f o r m led to a rapid economic g r o w t h , it b r o u g h t 
a l o n g a n e x t r e m e l y high rate of inflation, intensified 
s e c t o r a l imbalances and d e t e r i o r a t i n g p r o d u c t i v e 
e f f i c i e n c y as w e l l . The central authorities 
i m p l e m e n t e d r e t r e n c h m e n t p o l i c i e s in September 1988 to 
s t a b i l i z e the economic e n v i r o n m e n t and suppress the 
i n f l a t i o n . D e s p i t e the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the p o l i c i e s , 
the e c o n o m y g r a d u a l l y ran out of c o n t r o l . Sectoral 
i m b a l a n c e s b e c o m e m o r e serious and p r o d u c t i v e 
e f f i c i e n c y continued to d e c l i n e . T h e r e f o r e , u n d e r the 
u n s t a b l e e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n , the TFP d e c l i n e d in 1989. 
A s shown b y the F-tests on the estimates of 
T R D S from T a b l e 12a-14, R&D haS a p o s i t i v e effect on 
the p r o d u c t i v i t y b o t h in the level and the first-
d i f f e r e n c e e s t i m a t i o n s . Other explanatory v a r i a b l e s 
a r e o n l y significant in the level estimation. 
Therefore, R^D seems to be the most important way to 
i m p r o v e the', p r o d u c t i v i t y of e n t e r p r i s e s . A l t h o u g h the 
e f f e c t of R&D is negative in some sectors, this can be 
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e x p l a i n e d b y the nature of research and development. 
Some e n t e r p r i s e s with high R&D m a y expect to capture 
the r e t u r n in the long run, others m a y spend lower R&D 
b u t expect to capture the return in a shorter p e r i o d . 
D i f f e r e n t types of investment on R&D are likely to 
w e a k e n the short-term relationship between investment 
a n d r e t u r n . Besides, research is a risky investment, 
there is a possibility of failing to get the reward. 
T h e r e f o r e , individual sectors m a y have a negative 
c o e f f i c i e n t . However, the joint test across sectors 
still gives a prominent future for R & D . 
On the whole, the estimates of SHUBEI are 
p o s i t i v e for the level estimation, i.e., if the 
enterprises‘ share of output is high, then there will 
b e a p o s i t i v e effect on technology advancement. 
T h e r e f o r e , Schumpeter's hypothesis is supported by the 
d a t a . The advantages of large enterprises come from 
the security of finance for risky R&D project and 
there are economies of scale in technology of R & D . 
B e s i d e s , larger enterprises usually have been endowed 
w i t h h i g h e r percentage of technical personnel (Table 
2)• Furthermore, a high share of product market 
ensures a higher return on R & D . The result shows that 
the advantages of large enterprises have overwhelmed 
the m a n a g e m e n t problems in China. For the estimation 
of first-difference production function, the estimated 
coefficient is no longer statistically significant. 
This is because first-difference production 
exaggerates the effect of difference but is unable to 
show the level. However, the market power may be more 
m e a n i n g f u l in the level estimation than in difference 
formulation because the level estimation can explain 
the expected returns to R&D but the changes for a few 
years m a y not affect the investment decision on R&D. 
Therefore, it is likely that the changes of SHUBEI are 
unable to measure the relationship between the output 
and m a r k e t power. To conclude, large enterprises in 
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China still have a comparative advantage over research 
a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . 
The estimates of vintage effect using equation 
(4.1) show that enterprises with more newly purchased 
capital are m o r e productive. W i t h the exception of the 
textile industry, which has a negative estimate, the 
inflation effect overwhelms the effect of improvement 
in technology embodied in newly purchased, capital 
g o o d s . The estimates are statistically insignificant 
from the first-difference estimation. This indicates 
that the vintage effect does not have a very strong 
effect on productivity improvement. It also means that 
upgrading technology through direct purchase of new 
machines and equipment cannot increase the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y immediately. Enterprises have to adopt 
new technology gradually, customize it to meet the 
specific needs and train up the workers of the related 
f i e l d . 
Before considering the effect of retained 
profit, it is to be noticed that the estimated 
coefficient of RTPO is negative. This means that 
without retained profit enterprises perform poorly. 
The estimated results show that the use of 
retained profit to increase workers‘ incentive is more 
effective than bonus and fringe b e n e f i t . This evidence 
supports the argument that, bonus payment and fringe 
benefits are neither linked to the effort of 
individual worker nor performance of the enterprises. 
Therefore, it is unable to raise the productivity of 
w o r k e r . 
Retained profit improves labour productivity 
because it .links retained profit with enterprises 
p r o f i t . A portion of retained profit becomes part of 
workers‘ benefits which in turn links workers ‘ return 
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to enterprises‘ per f o r m a n c e . A l t h o u g h there is 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l noise that m a y hinder workers' outcome 
a n d thus reduce workers' work incentive, the result 
shows that there is still a boost to workers ‘ 
incentive (see A p p e n d i x 4 ) . 
： 一 
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Chapter 5. An Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 
1987-89 
5.1 An Introduction 
U n d e r perfect competition when resources are 
p e r f e c t l y m o b i l e , the values of marginal products of 
inputs w i l l be equalized across different firms. 
H o w e v e r , in a socialist economy, factors cannot move 
freely. Instead, the flow of factors is tightly 
controlled in China. Before 1978, the central 
authorities controlled the distribution of all major 
industrial materials such as crude oil, coal, steel, 
timber and cement。 In the reform period, the amount 
and v a r i e t y of producer goods allocated by the state 
have b e e n d e c r e a s i n g . The introduction of the dual 
p r i c e system allows market prices to appear side by 
side with state p r i c e s . M a n y producers are selling 
m o r e and m o r e of their goods through the market rather 
than to the p l a n . The material markets by 1988 
totalled 395 throughout China. In addition, there were 
m o r e than 900 county-level trade centers (Jackson, 
1992) . T h u s , the supply and the sale of input 
materials are increasingly channelled through the 
m a r k e t . 
W i t h regard to the capital market, various 
forms of new financial instruments have emerged in the 
large cities and rural townships. Most of the issued 
securities are shares (Wang, 1987)• By the end of 1986, 
despite the negligible number of traded shares' "stock 
exchanges" were established in Shenyang and Shanghai, 
two of Chinese main industrial centers. In 1988, the 
State Commission for Restructuring the Economy 
regarded the emergence of a share holding system as 
one of the xnajor tasks (Tarn, 1991) Even inside the 
s t a t e - o w n e d " enterprises, the share of state-budgeted 
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i n v e s t m e n t is d e c l i n i n g from 38.6 p e r c e n t in 1981 to 
13.2 in 1992 (Table 15). 
W i t h regard to the l a b o u r m a r k e t , several 
r e f o r m p o l i c i e s have b e e n l a u n c h e d . Enterprise 
m a n a g e r s h a v e g r e a t e r p o w e r in choosing individual 
w o r k e r s r a t h e r than accepting the a l l o c a t i o n b y the 
l a b o u r b u r e a u . H o w e v e r , they are still bound b y 
m a n d a t o r y q u o t a s . To reform the job tenure system 
w h i c h is a m a j o r constraint on the increase of labour 
p r o d u c t i v i t y , one of the p o l i c i e s attempts to w e a k e n 
the p r i n c i p l e of "iron-rice-bowl" b y p u t t i n g state-
o w n e d e n t e r p r i s e s workers on labour contracts since 
1 9 9 2 . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , the p o l i c y has encountered a 
g r e a t d e a l of resistance from w o r k e r s . By the end of 
1 9 8 6 , o n l y 5.24 m i l l i o n state w o r k e r s were on 
c o n t r a c t s , a n d the figure is about 5.6 percent of the 
total (Write, 1988) . A n o t h e r p r o b l e m on labour 
m a n a g e m e n t is the managers ‘ abi l i t y to lay off w o r k e r s , 
e i t h e r in response to changing demand for labour or to 
workers‘ p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e . In g e n e r a l , state-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s h a v e less power in dismissing workers than 
e n t e r p r i s e s b e l o n g i n g to other types of ownership. In 
T a b l e 16, there is a comparison b e t w e e n state-owned 
a n d c o l l e c t i v e - o w n e d enterprises on the percentage of 
d i s m i s s a l rate in relation to the total labour 
e m p l o y e d . The Table shows that the percentage of 
d i s m i s s e d w o r k e r is lower in state-owned enterprises 
(between .0.094 to 0.184) than the collective-owned 
e n t e r p r i s e s (between 0.134 to 0.348) (Table 16) . In 
1 9 8 9 , w h e n the pace of reform was slowed down and m a n y 
e n t e r p r i s e s w e r e running below capacity, the dismissal 
rate of small- sized enterprises in the collective 
s e c t o r surpassed state-owned enterprises by 114 
percent. Therefore, state-owned enterprises, which 
e m p l o y m o r e ：than 70 percent of the non-agricultural 
l a b o u r force, still have a low degree of autonomy in 
e m p l o y i n g and dismissing w o r k e r s . 
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C o m p a r e d w i t h the liberalization of the factor 
m a r k e t s , the development of m a r k e t for m a t e r i a l inputs 
m a y be the f a s t e s t . The capital and labour market 
r e f o r m s w e r e carried out at a slower p a c e , since 
b a n k r u p t c y of enterprises and unempl oyment are 
p o l i t i c a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g . W i t h the above background 
in m i n d , it is clear that factor markets are far from 
p e r f e c t . H o w e v e r , significant progress has been m a d e . 
T h e o r e t i c a l l y , as factors become more m o b i l e , 
r e s o u r c e s a l l o c a t i o n should be improved. 
The following section explores whether there is 
a t e n d e n c y for the values of m a r g i n a l products to 
c o n v e r g e . T h e i r relationship with the degree of 
o p e n n e s s of the factor markets during the short time 
p e r i o d 1987-89 will be examined. The analysis aims at 
finding out the impact of reform on allocative 
e f f i c i e n c y . 
5.2 The Value of Marginal Products and Their 
Implications 
The values of the marginal products of factors 
are formulated using equation (4.1) and calculated 
u s i n g the estimated results from Table 12c. 
The v a l u e of marginal products of capital is (see 
a p p e n d i x 3 for notations): 
] 伪 ‘ 此‘ A " ( 5 1 ) 
The v a l u e of marginal products of labour is： 
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】此、，〜d\nLu’t ht 
0 ( ) 二 (fir队RTPL”.’,、； 
T h e v a l u e of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t s of m a t e r i a l is: 
VMPM二 = 
j’ "InM仏，A^, ” 
y (5.3) 
‘ 
w h e r e Q.^ ^ is the v a l u e of o u t p u t . 
T a b l e 17 reports the s t a t i s t i c s of V M P K , V M P L 
a n d V M P M for each y e a r ^ ^ . The m e a n s of V M P K are m o r e 
or less the same for the p e r i o d b e i n g s t u d i e d . The 
m e a n i n c r e a s e d by 7.59 p e r c e n t in 1988 but lowered 
a g a i n in 1989 b y 11.29 p e r c e n t . The coefficient of 
v a r i a t i o n is u s e d to m e a s u r e the d i s p e r s i o n of v a l u e s 
of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t s . It is equal to the standard 
d e v i a t i o n d i v i d e d by the r e s p e c t i v e m e a n . The results 
s h o w that the c o e f f i c i e n t of v a r i a t i o n of V M P K 
i n c r e a s e d from 0.8381 in 1987 to 1.0174 in 1989. 
T h e m e a n of V M P L was i n c r e a s i n g d r a m a t i c a l l y . 
It i n c r e a s e d b y 34.35 p e r c e n t in 1988 a n d 6.52 percent 
in 1 9 8 9 . On the other h a n d , the d i s p e r s i o n did not 
c h a n g e m u c h . 
W i t h respect to V M P M , its m e a n v a l u e increased 
at a s l o w e r p a c e than V M P L (from 0.8162 in 1987 to 
1.0094 in 1 9 8 9 ) . The c o e f f i c i e n t of v a r i a t i o n declined 
g r a d u a l l y from 0.5799 in 1987 to 0.5571 in 1989. 
： , 
18some Observations may have negative VMPL or VMPK. These value are difficult to be 
explained and were dropped when computing the statistics. 
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S i n c e the time span being studied is very short, 
it is d i f f i c u l t to m a k e any definitive conclusion. 
K e e p i n g this in mind., some p r e l i m i n a r y conclusions m a y 
be d e r i v e d from this study. W h e n comparing the three 
v a l u e s of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t s , the V M P K remains at a 
level b e t w e e n 0.53 to 0.61 w h i l e VMPL shows a dramatic 
i m p r o v e m e n t from 2.85 to 4.08, representing an 
increase of more than 40 p e r c e n t . This is because the 
g r o w t h of investment was v e r y rapid in this period, 
thus capital stock was increasing m u c h faster than 
o t h e r i n p u t s . The capital stock increased by 41.58 
p e r c e n t from 1987 to 1989 but labour input decreased 
b y 1.68 p e r c e n t . The m a t e r i a l input became relatively-
scarce w h e n capital input increased by more than 5 
t i m e s . T h e r e f o r e , the V M P M gradually increased. 
The allocation of m a t e r i a l inputs seems to be 
i m p r o v i n g . The dispersion of V M P M across enterprises 
d i m i n i s h e d gradually. This m a y be due to the opening 
up of m a t e r i a l market u n d e r reform. On the other hand, 
the d i s p e r s i o n of VMPK enlarged, implying that the 
capital m a r k e t is far from p e r f e c t . Capital could not 
b e a l l o c a t e d from low-return enterprises to high 
return e n t e r p r i s e s . Therefore, profitable enterprises, 
despite an increasing V M P K , m a y be unable to absorb 
new capital from enterprises showing poor performance. 
The d i s p e r s i o n of labour remained at a steady level 
b e c a u s e the turnover rate of workers is very low in 
the state-owned enterprise. Workers are difficult to 
m o v e from a less productive enterprise to a more 
p r o d u c t i v e one. Therefore, only the dispersion of 
V M P M reduced gradually because material market is more 
d e v e l o p e d than the other factor m a r k e t s . 
As a result, the most significant impact of 
reform is on： the market for material inputs which the 
p a c e of liberalization is the fastest. 
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Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks 
F r o m the analysis of changes in total factor 
p r o d u c t i v i t y of state-owned enterprises in Wuhan for 
the p e r i o d 1962-92, the findings suggest that the 
d e v e l o p m e n t of the Chinese industry is greatly 
influenced, b y erratic national p o l i c i e s . Before 1978, 
the g r o w t h rate of industrial productivity fluctuated 
g r e a t l y , ranging from 50.3 percent to -33.5 p e r c e n t . 
A f t e r 1 9 7 8 , the productivity growth rate became 
s t e a d i e r than that of the previous d e c a d e s . In 1984-88, 
the a v e r a g e annual p r o d u c t i v i t y growth rate was fast 
a n d s t e a d y , at about 2.6 p e r c e n t . In 1989, after the 
r e t r e n c h m e n t policies, the economy fluctuated again 
b u t at a m u c h lower amplitude than that of either the 
G r e a t - L e a p Forward or Cultural Revolution. T h u s , 
economic r e f o r m has improved the performance of 
industry b y providing a relatively stable economic 
e n v i r o n m e n t . Such an environment is likely to attract 
l o n g - t e r m investment and promote innovative activities, 
w h i c h are important factors for sustained productivity 
g r o w t h . 
A t the micro level, based on the enterprise-
level p a n e l data of W u h a n , the empirical study arrives 
at the following findings: 
(1) R&D spending is the most important factor 
that a c c o u n t s for the productivity differences between 
e n t e r p r i s e s . 
(2) Schumpeter' s hypothesis is supported by the 
d a t a . The advantages of large enterprises come from 
the security of finance for risky R&D project and 
better endowment of technical personnel. Besides, 
there are economies of scale in technology of R&D and 
the high share of product market ensures a higher 
return on R & D . 
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(3) W h i l e the v i n t a g e effect of the capital 
stock b a s e d on the level estimation exerts a 
s i g n i f i c a n t impact on p r o d u c t i v i t y , it does not have a 
v e r y strong effect on improving productivity because 
the effect is insignificant under the difference 
f o r m u l a t i o n . The empirical evidence seems to show that 
the u p g r a d i n g of technology through direct purchase of 
new m a c h i n e s and equipment cannot improve the 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l level instantaneously. Enterprises have 
to adopt the new technology gradually, customize it to 
m e e t the specific needs and train up workers of the 
related f i e l d s . 
(4) The use of retained profit to increase 
workers‘ incentive seems to be more effective than 
b o n u s p a y m e n t s and fringe b e n e f i t s . This evidence 
supports the argument that bonus payment and fringe 
benefits are neither linked to the performance of 
enterprises nor to the effort of individual w o r k e r . 
T h e r e f o r e , it is unable to raise the productivity of 
w o r k e r s . On the other hand, since a portion of 
retained p r o f i t is distributed to workers as material 
awards in the form of bonus or other benefits, it is 
able to raise the incentive to w o r k . 
(5) From the study of the factor returns, the 
results suggest that the marginal product for material 
inputs shows a tendency to converge. Since the pace of 
reform is likely to be the fastest in that market, the 
free flow of the material inputs reduces the 
dispersion in the value of marginal product and thus 
improves allocative efficiency. The findings seem to 
suggest that there is still a long way to go in 
liberalizing the labour and capital markets. 
： ^ 
To conclude, in order to acqui:re a continuous 
and steady growth in productivity, the policies of the 
65 
c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t should create a stable environment 
b e f o r e rapid p r o d u c t i v i t y growth can be sustained. Our 
e m p i r i c a l findings have confirmed that violent swings 
in e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s may have disastrous consequences. 
O n l y a stable economic environment can attract long-
t e r m investment on R&D and infrastructure which are 
the m o s t important elements for productivity g r o w t h . 
B e s i d e s , p r o j e c t s on R&D have to be carried out to 
c u s t o m i z e the newly imported technology to the 
specific needs of the local e n t e r p r i s e s , to innovate 
new p r o d u c t i o n function, to increase product quality 
a n d to improve the production c a p a c i t i e s . With regard 
to labour m a n a g e m e n t , the bonus system that is not 
u s e d to a w a r d the performance of worker cannot 
increase labour productivity, but the retained profit 
that has some links with output increases the 
incentive to w o r k . Therefore, linking the efforts of 
w o r k e r s to output is important for raising the 
p r o d u c t i v i t y of workers. More sophisticated management 
schemes should be developed in order to tighten the 
linkage b e t w e e n workers‘ return and their efforts. 
M o r e o v e r , as factor mobility improves allocative 
e f f i c i e n c y , the introduction of market mechanism into 
the capital and labour markets will greatly increase 
the output and leads to a faster growth rate. However, 
there are still many obstacles existing in the 
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of capital and labour markets because 
the b a n k r u p t c y of enterprises and unemployment m a y 
cause p o l i t i c a l instability. Further research on the 
ways to improve factor mobility should be conducted to 
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Appendix 1： The Data Set 
T w o d a t a sets are u s e d for the e m p i r i c a l s t u d y . 
T h e f i r s t d a t a set is c i t y - l e v e l time series data from 
1962 to 1 9 9 2 . It is d e r i v e d from the "Wuhan 
S t a t i s t i c a l Data" v o l . 1 (1990), a n d W u h a n S t a t i s t i c a l 
Y e a r b o o k 1 9 9 0 , 1991, 1992 a n d 1 9 9 3 . The data set 
c o n s i s t s of a g g r e g a t e o u t p u t s , l a b o u r , capital a n d 
r e t a i n e d p r o f i t of stated-owned, i n d e p e n d e n t a c c o u n t i n g 
e n t e r p r i s e s of W u h a n , T h e a g g r e g a t e v a l u e s of 
i n d e p e n d e n t a c c o u n t i n g e n t e r p r i s e s are selected to 
i m p r o v e the q u a l i t y of the data b e c a u s e the a c c o u n t i n g 
s y s t e m s of these e n t e r p r i s e s are m o r e c r e d i t a b l e . The 
d a t a set is listed in T a b l e 5 , 
In o r d e r to find out the sources of 
p r o d u c t i v i t y d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g the e n t e r p r i s e s , the 
o t h e r d a t a set from the "Wuhan S t a t i s t i c a l D a t a " , V o l . 
1 (1990) is e m p l o y e d . This is a set of enterprise-
l e v e l p a n e l data w h i c h c o n s i s t s of m o r e than 200 
m e d i u m to large size i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s of W u h a n 
for the y e a r 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 9 . To i m p r o v e the quality of 
e s t i m a t i o n , enterprises w i t h m i s s i n g y e a r s , i.e., 
t h e i r a c c o u n t i n g records only c o n t a i n one or two years 
o n l y , a r e d i s c a r d e d . B e s i d e s , the enterprises are 
d i v i d e d into different sectors a c c o r d i n g to their 
b u s i n e s s n a t u r e in orcier to analyze sectoral 
d i f f e r e n c e s / i n i t i a l l y , e l e v e n sectors are selected. 
H o w e v e r , there are four sectors w i t h less tha.n ten 
e n t e r p r i s e s and are d r o p p e d . A s a r e s u l t , only 131 
s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises are u s e d for e s t i m a t i o n . W i t h 
131 s t a t e - o w n e d enterprises from 1987 to 1989, the 
t o t a l n u m b e r of o b s e r v a t i o n s are 3 9 3 . The seven 
s e c t o r s are: 
1) Textile Industry 
2) L i g h t Industry (including p a p e r - m a k i n g & paper 
products,：and chemical fibers) ^ 
3) Machinery Industry 
4) Transport Equipment Industry 
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5) E l e c t r o n i c Industry 
6) B u i l d i n g Ma^terial Industry 
7) C h e m i c a l Industry 
* ^ 
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Appendix 2: Fixed and Quota Working Capital 
In the Chinese enterprises‘ ac c o u n t i n g s y s t e m , 
t h e r e a r e s e v e r a l items r e l a t i n g to c a p i t a l . The first 
is g r o s s c a p i t a l s t o c k . It is c a l c u l a t e d as the sum of 
the p r e v i o u s y e a r ' s total stock and the new investment 
v a l u e in the current y e a r in current p r i c e . T h u s , it 
m a y fail to reflect trends in real stock of capital 
u n l e s s the a b s o l u t e and r e l a t i v e p r i c e s of investment 
g o o d s r e m a i n s t a b l e . A s u b - i t e m in gross capital stock 
is g r o s s p r o d u c t i v e capital w h i c h is supposed to 
c o n t a i n the capital that are d i r e c t l y related to 
p r o d u c t i o n , e . g . , factories and m a c h i n e s . A n o t h e r item 
is net c a p i t a l stock w h i c h is equal to the gross 
c a p i t a l s t o c k m i n u s the a c c u m u l a t e d d e p r e c i a t i o n . From 
the a b o v e three items, net p r o d u c t i v e capital can be 
g e n e r a t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y as the p r o d u c t i v e capital 
times the r a t i o of net capital stock to gross capital 
s t o c k . 
T h e final item to be introduced is "quota 
working capital“ (dinge lindong zijin), which 
r e p r e s e n t s the normal m i n i m u m requirement for 
f i n a n c i n g stocks of m a t e r i a l , p r o d u c t i o n and 
i n v e n t o r i e s . As suggested b y Chen et al (1988), the 
case for including w o r k i n g capital in p r o d u c t i v i t y 
c a l c u l a t i o n rests on its contribution to the 
p r o d u c t i o n p r o c e s s . A lack of working capital can 
limit .economic e x p a n s i o n . M o r e o v e r , some enterprises-
m a y u s e w o r k i n g capital to purchase capital g o o d s . On 
the o t h e r h a n d , the excessive use of working capital 
m a y r e s t r i c t output growth if it causes input shortage 
t h r o u g h w i d e s p r e a d of hoarding of scarce material• 
B e s i d e s , a n o t h e r v i e w for excluding working capital is 
b e c a u s e its influence reflects the performance of the 
distribution： system rather than t h e , efficiency of 
current p r o d u c t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r to include the 
w o r k i n g c a p i t a l depends on empirical a n a l y s i s . If the 
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w o r k i n g c a p i t a l is to be u s e d , then we combine the net 
p r o d u c t i o n c a p i t a l stock and the quota working capital 
to form a total productive capital stock. This 
p r a c t i c e is s i m i l a r to Chow (1993), i.e.： 
T o t a l p r o d u c t i v e capital stock (K) 





Appendix 3 ： Summary of Notations 
t t ime t 
i s e c t o r i 
j e n t e r p r i s e j 
Y O u t p u t in constant p r i c e 
Q O u t p u t in current p r i c e 
A T e c h n o l o g i c a l level 
K C a p i t a l Stock 
N P K N e t p r o d u c t i o n capital 
W K W o r k i n g capital 
L A v e r a g e n u m b e r of w o r k e r e m p l o y e d 
M D e f l a t e d m a t e r i a l input 
L N Y N a t u r a l log of Y 
L N L N a t u r a l log of L 
L N M N a t u r a l log of M 
L N K N a t u r a l log of K 
T F P T o t a l factor p r o d u c t i v i t y 
D B 8 4 D u m m y for structural change； 1 for the years 
b e f o r e 1984 
D C A P D u m m y for the y e a r s the p r o d u c e u n d e r 
c a p a c i t y 
C O M P M e a s u r e s the c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s 
T R D S A g g r e g a t e d R&D e x p e n d i t u r e 
RDS R&D e x p e n d i t u r e of the y e a r 
S H U B E I M e a s u r e s the size of the enterprise,, equals 
to the share of sales relative the 
r e s p e c t i v e i n d u s t r y . 
R T P L R e t a i n e d p r o f i t p e r l a b o u r 
B O N L T o t a l Bonus p e r labour 
FWL F r i n g e Benefits and W e l f a r e p e r labour 
V I N T V i n t a g e correction for c a p i t a l 
V M P K V a l u e of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t of capital 
V M P L V a l u e of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t of labour 
V M P M V a l u e of m a r g i n a l p r o d u c t of m a t e r i a l 
P A v e r a g e price level , 
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Appendix 4： The Relationship between Payment 
Scheme and the Incentive to Work 
Consider a simple model on the relationship 
b e t w e e n payment schedule and the incentive to work of 
a typical w o r k e r . To simplify the analysis, a linear 
output function is assumed： 、 
y= 7DC + (\- 7r)d (A4.1) 
where y is the random outcome which depends on the 
worker ‘ s effort, ；c, and the exogenous risk ~6 is 
assumed normally distributed with zero mean and 
v a r {0) = o ^, 71 varies from 0 to 1, and is the weight 
of worker‘s effort and exogenous risk. 
The payment schedule for the worker is also 
linear： 
P{y)^r + sy (A4.2) 
where r is the fixed payment for the worker and s is 
the share of realized output, y. s varies from 0 to 1, 
and a non-zero s implies that worker has a claim on 
the outcome. 
Workers are assumed to be risk averse and 
posses an exponential utility function： 
w 二一exp(—Ofw), a > 0 (A4.3) 
which w denotes the worker's wealth or income, and a 
u" 
is the risk aversion parameter which is equal to ( ) 
u' 
with primes stand for derivatives. The worker‘s wealth 
depends on the payment schedule and disutility of 
effort. To preserve the strict concavity of the 
worker's utility function, the disutility of effort is 
assumed, to be a quadratic function (x” . Thus, the « 
worker‘s random wealth is ‘ 
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r ~ "I 
w = r + s 7a-\-{\-k)6 -x^ (A4.4) 
• • 
The worker‘s certainty equivalent utility 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b o t h the w e a l t h level in equation 
(A4.4) and the constant risk a_version utility function 
(A4.3) is： 
= E { w ) - ci^var(w) 
A s s u m i n g the utility is greater than the 
a c c e p t a n c e level, A , and there is an interior solution, 
i.e., the w o r k e r is willing to work for this payment 
s c h e d u l e . T h e n , when the worker chose the optimal 
effort to m a x i m i z e the utility function, the first 
order condition will be satisfied: 
Tus-lx 二 0 
TIS 
X 二 一 2 
It is obvious that the effort level is positively 
related to the share of output paid for the worker. 
In this case, the noise of the environment, 0, 
only hinders part of the output, y , i.e. , ；t^O . Then, 
the worker's output, y , is still related to his effort. 
T h e r e f o r e , since the retained profit links the return 
of workers to their effort, it is likely to raise the 




Appendix 5a: Mean, Variance, Maximum and MiirLnmm for each Variable 
O r i g i n a l D a t a 
N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
聽 393 10 . 131 0 . 93512 0 .87444 7 . 8785 12 .232 
T R D S 3 9 3 0 . 3 3 2 1 1 E - 0 1 0 . 6 8 0 6 1 E - 0 1 0 . 4 6 3 2 3 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 8 3 7 6 
R D S 3 9 3 0 . 1 6 4 5 9 E - 0 1 0 . 3 6 2 5 2 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 1 4 2 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
R D S L 3 9 3 0 . 1 0 9 4 9 E - 0 1 0 . 3 2 9 7 6 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 8 7 4 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
R D S L L 3 9 3 0 . 5 8 0 2 4 E - 0 2 0 . 2 7 6 3 9 E - 0 1 0,76391E—〇3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
S H U B E I 3 9 3 0 . 1 6 4 6 3 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 9 1 5 E - 0 1 0 , 5 2 5 1 0 E - 0 3 0 . 6 9 8 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 1 7 7 9 3 
L N K 3 9 3 1 0 . 2 6 6 0 . 7 8 8 3 0 0 . 6 2 1 4 1 8 . 6 6 1 0 1 2 . 7 1 5 
L N L 3 9 3 7 . 3 8 0 3 0 . 7 5 0 1 4 0 . 5 6 2 7 0 5 . 1 8 7 4 9 . 2 8 0 8 
L N M 3 9 3 9 . 5 8 6 0 1 . 0 7 3 5 1 . 1 5 2 5 6 . 8 3 8 2 1 1 . 9 9 7 
V I N T 3 9 3 1 . 7 0 4 5 0 . 4 5 0 1 6 0 . 2 0 2 6 4 0 . 1 9 0 2 0 4 . 9 1 5 8 
R T P L 3 9 3 0 . 8 6 7 0 4 1 . 3 6 1 0 1 . 8 5 2 4 - 0 . 1 4 3 3 5 1 7 . 2 0 0 
B O N L 3 9 3 0 . 1 6 4 0 6 0 . 2 4 7 2 9 0 . 6 1 1 5 1 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 . 9 8 8 8 
例 L 3 9 3 1 . 2 7 6 2 0 . 6 9 9 7 7 0 . 4 8 9 6 7 0 . 9 8 7 8 9 E - 0 1 9 . 5 3 6 3 
O r i g i n a l D a t a : p r i n t e d b y s e c t o r s 
S e c t o r 1 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 60 1 1 . 0 5 3 0 . 7 8 7 9 3 0 . 6 2 0 8 4 9 . 5 7 2 1 1 2 . 2 2 0 
T R D S 60 0 . 2 4 5 2 9 E - 0 1 0 . 5 1 9 7 0 E - 0 1 0 . 2 7 0 0 8 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 7 8 2 2 
R D S 60 0 . 1 5 7 3 3 E - 0 1 0 . 3 6 1 3 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 0 5 5 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 5 8 1 4 
R D S L 60 0 . 6 0 0 4 4 E - 0 2 0 . 1 2 4 3 3 E - 0 1 0 . 1 5 4 5 7 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 8 5 7 6 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 60 0 . 2 7 9 0 7 E - 0 2 0 . 7 0 5 1 3 E - 0 2 0 . 4 9 7 2 0 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 1 5 0 4 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 60 0 . 1 1 1 9 0 E - 0 1 0 . 1 7 0 4 8 E - 0 1 0 . 2 9 0 6 2 E - 0 3 0 . 1 1 8 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 8 8 4 9 0 E - 0 1 
L N K 60 1 0 . 7 0 7 0 . 6 8 7 9 1 0 . 4 7 3 2 1 9 . 2 0 6 2 1 1 . 7 7 3 
L N L 60 8 . 1 0 1 1 0 . 6 4 6 7 6 0 . 4 1 8 3 0 6 . 4 3 7 8 9 . 2 1 2 9 
L N M 60 1 0 . 6 4 8 0 . 8 0 2 3 6 0 . 6 4 3刀 8 . 9 9 5 5 1 1 . 9 9 7 
V I N T 60 1 . 6 5 4 2 0 . 3 8 7 2 1 0 . 1 4 9 9 3 1 . 1 1 6 7 2 . 6 4 7 4 
R T P L 60 0 . 5 4 2 4 3 0 . 5 8 1 3 7 0 . 3 3 7 9 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 0 9 7 
B O N L 60 0 . 8 7 9 8 0 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 1 8 7 0 . 1 7 3 8 9 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 6 9 9 4 
F W L 60 1 . 3 0 1 8 0 . 5 3 3 4 1 0 . 2 8 4 5 3 0 . 2 9 1 5 4 2 . 7 3 5 2 
S e c t o r 2 
N A M E N M E A N . S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 42 9 . 9 1 3 9 0 . 5 5 0 2 8 0 . 3 0 2 8 1 8 . 9 3 9 8 1 1 . 2 8 3 
‘ T R D S 42 0 . 7 4 8 8 2 E - 0 1 0 . 1 4 9 6 1 0 . 2 2 3 8 2 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 8 3 7 6 
R D S 42 0 . 3 3 7 6 6 E - 0 1 0 . 7 1 2 2 2 E - 0 1 0 . 5 0 7 2 6 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
R D S L 42 0 . 2 5 3 6 1 E - 0 1 0 . 7 1 1 1 7 E - 0 1 0 . 5 0 5 7 7 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
R D S L L 42 0 . 1 5 7 5 4 E - 0 1 0 . 6 6 4 8 9 E - 0 1 0 . 4 4 2 0 7 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 4 0 1 
S H U B E I 42 0 . 3 4 6 9 8 E - 0 1 0 . 2 4 4 1 5 E - 0 1 0 . 5 9 6 0 9 E - 0 3 0 . 1 0 2 4 2 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 4 3 0 
L N K 42 1 0 . 0 4 8 0 . 5 7 8 3 3 0 . 3 3 4 4 7 9 . 0 4 3 4 1 1 . 7 8 5 
L N L 42 6 . 8 0 5 7 0 . 6 2 1 2 5 0 . 3 8 5 9 6 6 . 0 8 6 8 8 . 3 6 7 5 
L N M 42 9 . 5 4 4 3 0 . 6 6 7 4 1 0 . 4 4 5 4 3 8 . 1 4 9 0 1 0 . 9 5 2 
V I N T 42 1 . 5 4 2 8 0 . 2 7 7 7 8 0 . 7 7 1 6 2 E - 0 1 1 . 1 2 9 7 2 . 2 4 5 5 
R T P L 42 0 . 9 6 7 6 6 0 . 9 6 2 5 9 0 . 9 2 6 5 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 7 2 8 1 
B O N L 42 0 . 2 7 2 3 4 0 . 2 7 7 8 0 0 . 7 7 1 7 3 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 9 8 9 6 7 
F W L 42 1 . 4 8 1 9 0 . 4 4 7 0 7 0 . 1 9 9 8 7 0 . 7 4 1 0 2 3 . 0 3 1 0 
S e c t o r 3 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 1 2 0 9 . 8 5 5 9 0 . 7 7 8 1 9 0 . 6 0 5 5 9 8 . 2 3 9 3 1 2 . 1 1 3 
T R D S 1 2 0 0 . 2 8 6 4 2 E - 0 1 0 . 5 3 5 9 7 E - 0 1 0 . 2 8 7 2 6 E - 0 2 ,0.00000 0 . 2 5 7 8 8 
R D S 1 2 0 0 . 1 4 3 2 5 E - 0 1 0 . 3 1 3 8 0 E - 0 1 0 . 9 8 4 6 7 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L 1 2 0 0 . 9 7 8 2 6 E - 0 2 0 . 3 0 1 1 8 E - 0 1 0 . 9 0 7 0 7 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L L 1 2 0 0 . 4 5 3 4 5 E - 0 2 0 . 2 1 3 7 0 E - 0 1 0 . 4 5 6 6 9 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
S H U B E I 12〇 0 . 5 3 8 1 2 E - 0 2 0 . 5 4 8 7 7 E - 0 2 0 . 3 0 1 1 5 E - 0 4 0 . 9 3 0 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 3 2 0 3 6 E - 0 1 
L N K 1 2 0 1 0 . 1 7 9 0 . 7 6 9 2 6 0 . 5 9 1 7 6 8 . 7 9 7 2 1 2 . 4 9 9 
L N L 1 2 0 7 . 3 2 8 5 0 . 6 4 7 4 9 0 . 4 1 9 2 4 5 . 1 8 7 4 9 . 1 8 5 9 
L N M 1 2 0 9 . 2 3 3 0 0 . 9 3 1 2 7 0 . 8 6 7 2 7 7 . 5 0 6 6 1 1 . 6 0 2 
V I N T 1 2 0 1 . 8 8 7 0 0 . 5 9 1 0 5 0 . 3 4 9 3 4 1 . 1 6 8 5 4 . 9 1 5 8 
R T P L 1 2 0 0 . 9 3 3 4 2 1 . 7 2 7 1 2 . 9 8 2 9 - 0 . 1 1 2 5 8 1 7 . 2 0 0 
B O N L 1 2 0 0 . 1 7 3 4 1 0 . 3 1 7 2 2 0 . 1 0 0 6 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 2 . 9 8 8 8 
F W L 1 2 0 1 . 2 6 5 8 1 . 0 1 8 6 1 . 0 3 7 5 0 . 3 4 7 2 6 9 . 5 3 6 3 
« 
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S e c t o r 4 
N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
LNY 63 1 0 . 1 9 7 0 . 8 5 3 9 0 0 . 7 2 9 1 5 8 . 2 2 4 2 1 1 . 8 8 1 
T R D S 63 0 . 3 3 8 2 7 E - 0 1 0 . 5 5 0 2 4 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 2 7 6 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 3 1 7 8 
R D S 63 0 . 1 5 4 0 9 E - 0 1 0 . 3 2 4 8 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 5 5 0 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
R D S L 63 0 . 1 2 1 0 4 E - 0 1 0 . 3 1 2 2 2 E - 0 1 0 . 9 7 4 8 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
R D S L L 63 0 . 6 3 1 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 2 4 2 8 0 E - 0 1 0.58954E—03 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
S H U B E I 63 0 . 6 1 5 7 9 E - 0 2 0 . 4 9 4 3 7 E - 0 2 0 . 2 4 4 4 0 E - 0 4 0 . 6 9 8 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 2 4 9 8 2 E - 0 1 
L N K 63 1 0 . 5 7 2 0 . 8 7 8 5 5 0 . 7 7 1 8 4 8 . 9 6 6 9 1 2 . 7 1 5 
L N L 63 7 . 6 4 7 4 0 . 8 6 0 1 9 0 . 7 3 9 9 2 6 . 0 6 8 4 9 . 2 8 0 8 
L N M 63 9 . 6 1 5 9 0 . 9 4 0 6 3 0 . 8 8 4 7 8 7 . 3 8 4 0 1 1 . 8 2 6 
V I N T 63 1 . 7 0 4 7 0 . 4 1 6 5 4 0 . 1 7 3 5 0 0 . 1 9 0 2 0 2 . 5 4 9 3 
R T P L 63 0 . 4 7 7 4 5 0 . 5 5 4 6 6 0 . 3 0 7 6 5 - 0 . 1 4 3 3 5 2 . 4 2 3 6 
B C m 63 0 . 1 8 3 6 2 0 . 1 9 1 4 0 0 . 3 6 6 3 4 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 7 3 5 4 
例 L 63 1 . 1 3 8 5 0 . 3 6 9 8 0 0 . 1 3 6 7 5 0 . 9 8 7 8 9 E - 0 1 2 . 2 8 1 5 
S e c t o r 5 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 42 1 0 . 1 9 1 1 . 0 8 5 5 1 . 1 7 8 2 8 . 4 0 7 4 1 2 . 2 3 2 
T R D S 42 0 . 3 8 7 9 6 E - 0 1 0 . 4 1 2 4 6 E - 0 1 0 . 1 7 0 1 2 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 3 8 6 3 
R D S 42 0 . 1 9 1 4 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 0 9 0 2 E - 0 1 0 . 4 3 6 9 0 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L 42 0 . 1 3 1 5 0 E - 0 1 0 . 2 0 8 9 7 E - 0 1 0 . 4 3 6 6 9 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 42 0 . 6 5 0 0 3 E - 0 2 0 . 1 5 6 6 3 E - 0 1 0 . 2 4 5 3 2 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 42 0 . 3 6 5 0 3 E - 0 1 0 . 3 5 9 0 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 2 8 8 9 E - 0 2 0 . 1 3 8 1 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 4 7 1 9 
L N K 42 1 0 . 1 6 4 0 . 7 8 3 6 8 0 . 6 1 4 1 6 8 . 7 5 6 4 1 1 . 8 5 9 
L N L 42 7 . 1 5 8 7 0 . 5 2 8 1 0 0 . 2 7 8 8 9 6 . 4 2 4 9 8 . 0 9 6 5 
L N M - 42 9 . 1 9 5 4 1 . 3688 1 . 8 7 3 7 6 . 8 3 8 2 1 1 . 7 2 1 
V I N T 42 1 . 5 8 1 0 0 . 3 5 9 0 3 0 . 1 2 8 9 0 1 . 1 5 3 9 2 . 9 6 2 1 
R T P L 42 1 . 2 0 7 6 1 . 6 8 8 1 2 . 8 4 9 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 6 . 3 4 3 0 
B O N L 42 0 . 1 4 7 2 5 0 . 2 0 5 6 0 0 . 4 2 2 7 1 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 5 2 6 8 
F W L 42 1 . 2 6 1 7 0 . 6 3 5 5 9 0 . 4 0 3 9 7 0 . 3 7 5 5 4 3 . 8 8 8 6 
S e c t o r 6 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
LNY 33 9 . 1 0 9 8 0 . 5 6 7 7 1 0 . 3 2 2 2 9 7 . 8 7 8 5 1 0 . 3 1 6 
T R D S 33 0 . 1 3 3 4 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 9 5 3 2 E - 0 1 0 . 3 8 1 4 8 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 4 9 8 7 E - 0 1 
R D S 33 0 . 6 6 6 9 3 E - 0 2 0 . 1 1 5 2 7 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 2 8 6 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L 33 0 . 4 2 4 5 5 E - 0 2 0 . 1 0 6 0 9 E - 0 1 0 . 1 1 2 5 6 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 33 0 . 2 4 2 5 9 E - 0 2 0 . 9 6 6 5 0 E - 0 2 0 . 9 3 4 1 2 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 33 0 . 3 4 3 1 4 E - 0 1 0 . 1 9 9 3 4 E - 0 1 0 . 3 9 7 3 5 E - 0 3 0 . 8 0 2 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 8 3 4 6 4 E - 0 1 
L N K 33 9 . 5 6 2 4 0 . 5 3 0 8 0 0 . 2 8 1 7 5 8 . 6 6 1 0 1 0 . 5 7 1 
L N L 33 6 . 8 2 5 1 0 . 3 6 4 3 8 0 . 1 3 2 7 7 6 . 1 9 2 4 7.3834 
L N M 33 8 . 7 7 2 8 0 . 7 2 2 0 6 0 . 5 2 1 3 7 7 . 5 6 5 3 9 . 9 5 7 5 
V I N T 33 1 . 5 5 0 0 0 . 1 9 6 6 2 0 . 3 8 6 6 1 E - 0 1 1 . 1 7 7 8 1 . 9 9 5 3 
R T P L 33 0 . 6 2 6 0 1 0 . 7 3 7 2 4 0 . 5 4 3 5 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 7 2 9 
B O N L 33 0 . 2 0 4 5 6 0 . 2 2 7 0 6 0 . 5 1 5 5 7 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.92224 
F W L 33 1 . 2 7 2 4 0 . 5 5 5 0 6 0 . 3 0 8 1 0 0 . 5 3 6 3 5 2 . 6 6 4 9 
S e c t o r 7 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 33 1 0 . 5 5 0 0 . 6 8 9 3 2 0 . 4 7 5 1 6 9 . 2 1 9 3 1 1 . 6 8 0 
T R D S 33 0 . 2 4 1 5 9 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 7 6 6 E - 0 1 0 . 9 4 6 5 3 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 2 5 3 0 
R D S 33 0 . 1 1 8 8 5 E - 0 1 0 . 1 5 8 3 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 5 0 7 4 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 1 6 8 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L 33 0 . 7 5 4 0 4 E - 0 2 0 . 1 5 1 8 7 E - 0 1 0 . 2 3 0 6 4 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 1 6 8 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 33 0 . 4 7 3 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 3 6 6 9 E - 0 1 0 . 1 8 6 8 3 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 1 6 8 3 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 33 0 . 1 9 4 6 0 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 0 2 8 E - 0 1 0 . 9 0 1 6 7 E - 0 3 0 . 3 0 2 7 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 7 7 9 3 
L N K 33 1 0 . 3 0 3 0 . 6 1 8 1 8 0 . 3 8 2 1 4 9 . 1 4 1 8 1 1 . 8 5 0 
L N L 33 7 . 3 1 6 3 0 . 4 4 7 1 6 0 . 1 9 9 9 5 6 . 7 1 6 6 8 . 5 9 8 2 
L N M 33 1 0 . 2 4 6 0 . 7 6 2 8 7 0 . 5 8 1 9 7 8 . 8 2 0 3 1 1 . 3 6 7 
V I N T 33 1 . 6 4 9 4 0 . 2 3 7 1 5 0 . 5 6 2 3 8 E - 0 1 1 . 2 2 4 0 . 2 . 2 4 1 0 
R T P L 33 1 . 6 3 9 1 1 . 9 0 9 3 3 . 6 4 5 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 6 . 6 4 4 2 
B O N L 33 0 . 7 4 1 9 4 E - 0 1 0 . 1 7 1 8 7 0 . 2 9 5 3 9 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 2 4 0 6 
P W L 33 1 . 2 9 0 3 0 . 4 1 6 9 7 0 . 1 7 3 8 6 0 . 1 0 3 8 2 2 . 1 7 6 8 
»‘ 
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Appendix 5b: Mean, Variance, Maximum, and Minimum, for each Variable 
(Without outlieiFsy" “ 
A f t e r t h e d e l e t i o n o f o u t l i e r s 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 3 5 3 1 0 . 0 7 3 0 . 8 9 0 6 6 0 . 7 9 3 2 8 7 . 8 7 8 5 1 2 . 2 2 0 
T R D S 3 5 3 0 . 2 7 2 2 3 E - 0 1 0 . 4 3 5 7 3 E - 0 1 0 . 1 8 9 8 6 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 5 7 8 8 
R D S 3 5 3 0 . 1 4 0 3 9 E - 0 1 0 . 2 5 9 9 4 E - 0 1 0 . 6 7 5 7 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L 3 5 3 0 . 8 9 0 5 4 E - 0 2 0 . 2 3 7 8 2 E - 0 1 0 . 5 6 5 5 6 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L L 3 5 3 0 . 4 2 7 8 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 6 9 3 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 8 6 8 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
S H U B E I 3 5 3 0 . 1 3 1 0 8 E - 0 1 0 . 1 5 5 3 3 E - 0 1 0 . 2 4 1 2 7 E - 0 3 0 . 6 9 8 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 8 8 4 9 0 E - 0 1 
L N K 3 5 3 1 0 . 2 2 5 0 . 7 5 6 7 2 0 . 5 7 2 6 3 8 . 6 6 1 0 1 2 . 7 1 5 
L N L 3 5 3 7 . 3 8 1 1 0 . 7 1 9 2 1 0 . 5 1 7 2 6 6 . 0 6 8 4 9 . 2 1 2 9 
L N M 3 5 3 9 . 5 2 6 0 1 . 0 3 3 5 1 . 0 6 8 2 6 . 8 3 8 2 1 1 . 9 9 7 
V I N T 3 5 3 1 . 7 0 7 4 0 . 4 5 2 3 4 0 . 2 0 4 6 1 0 . 1 9 0 2 0 4 . 9 1 5 8 
R T P L 3 5 3 0 . 7 1 1 2 1 0 . 9 1 7 4 7 0 . 8 4 1 7 5 - 0 . 1 4 3 3 5 6 . 6 4 4 2 
B O N L 3 5 3 0 . 1 5 0 1 0 0 . 1 8 5 5 1 0 . 3 4 4 1 4 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 6 0 7 4 
隱 353 1 . 2 3 3 9 0 . 44361 0 . 19679 0 . 34726 3 .7618 
W i t h o u t l i e r s d e l e t e d : p r i n t e d b y s e c t o r s 
S e c t o r 1 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 5 8 1 1 . 0 7 5 0 . 7 8 4 4 8 0 . 6 1 5 4 1 9 . 5 7 2 1 1 2 . 2 2 0 
T R D S 58 0 . 1 8 8 5 3 E - 0 1 0 . 2 3 6 1 2 E - 0 1 0 . 5 5 7 5 2 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 2 0 0 8 
R D S ‘ 5 8 0 . 1 1 8 2 5 E - 0 1 0 . 1 7 3 3 3 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 0 4 5 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 8 5 7 6 E - 0 1 
R D S L 58 0 . 4 8 5 6 7 E - 0 2 0 . 8 1 0 1 0 E - 0 2 0 . 6 5 6 2 6 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 1 5 0 4 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 58 0 . 2 1 7 1 4 E - 0 2 0 . 4 9 6 4 3 E - 0 2 0 . 2 4 6 4 4 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 0 3 4 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 58 0 . 1 1 4 2 5 E - 0 1 0 . 1 7 2 8 8 E - 0 1 0 . 2 9 8 8 6 E - 0 3 0 . 1 1 8 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 8 8 4 9 0 E - 0 1 
L N K 5 8 1 0 . 7 1 7 0 . 6 8 8 9 7 0 . 4 7 4 6 8 9 . 2 0 6 2 1 1 . 7 7 3 
L N L 58 8 . 0 9 3 6 0 . 6 5 5 8 6 0 . 4 3 0 1 6 6 . 4 3 7 8 9 . 2 1 2 9 
L N M 58 1 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 7 9 3 6 4 0 . 6 2 9 8 7 8 . 9 9 5 5 1 1 . 9 9 7 
V I N T 58 1 . 6 4 8 4 0 . 3 7 3 0 1 0 . 1 3 9 1 4 1 . 1 1 6 7 2 . 6 4 7 4 
R T P L 58 0 . 5 4 7 9 8 0 . 5 8 6 3 5 0 . 3 4 3 8 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 0 0 9 7 
B O N L 58 0 . 8 5 4 1 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 2 9 9 0 . 1 7 6 8 7 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 6 9 9 4 
F W L 58 1 . 3 3 4 9 0 . 5 1 0 8 5 0 . 2 6 0 9 7 0 . 4 0 3 8 9 2 . 7 3 5 2 
S e c t o r 2 
_ N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 3 5 9 . 7 8 7 1 0 . 4 3 3 0 1 0 . 1 8 7 5 0 8 . 9 3 9 8 1 0 . 7 3 7 
T R D S 3 5 0 . 3 8 1 7 2 E - 0 1 0 . 4 6 9 6 4 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 0 5 7 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 1 0 4 9 
R D S 3 5 0 . 1 9 9 1 7 E - 0 1 0 . 2 4 5 9 2 E - 0 1 0 . 6 0 4 7 8 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 9 2 0 3 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L 3 5 0 . 1 1 8 2 0 E - 0 1 0 . 1 9 4 8 1 E - 0 1 0 . 3 7 9 4 9 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 8 9 5 5 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 3 5 0 . 6 4 3 4 7 E - 0 2 0 . 1 7 3 9 3 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 2 5 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 8 9 5 5 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 3 5 0 . 2 9 5 3 4 E - 0 1 0 . 1 8 2 2 8 E - 0 1 0 . 3 3 2 2 7 E - 0 3 0 . 1 0 2 4 2 E - 0 1 0 . 7 7 9 5 0 E - 0 1 
L N K 3 5 9 . 9 0 4 4 0 . 4 4 7 8 6 0 . 2 0 0 5 8 9 . 0 4 3 4 1 0 . 7 5 4 
L N L 3 5 6 . 6 8 0 9 0 . 4 8 4 8 3 0 . 2 3 5 0 6 6 . 0 8 6 8 7 . 4 9 5 5 
L N M 3 5 9 . 5 0 5 2 0 . 5 6 6 5 2 0 . 3 2 0 9 4 8 . 1 4 90 1 0 . 4 0 7 
V I N T 3 5 1 . 5 1 8 9 0 . 2 7 1 0 5 0 . 7 3 4 6 7 E - 0 1 1 . 1 2 9 7 2 . 2 4 5 5 
R T P L 3 5 0 . 8 1 4 8 9 0 . 7 8 9 8 8 0 . 6 2 3 9 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3 . 1 7 3 3 
B O N L 3 5 0 . 2 5 1 1 6 0 . 2 6 3 9 9 0 . 6 9 6 9 1 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 6 0 7 4 
F W L 3 5 1 . 4 5 4 4 0 . 4 0 1 7 8 0 . 1 6 1 4 3 0 . 7 4 1 0 2 2 . 2 8 5 4 
S e c t o r 3 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 1 1 5 9 . 7 9 1 8 0 . 7 0 9 0 1 0 . 5 0 2 7 0 8 . 2 3 9 3 1 1 . 2 5 5 
T R D S 1 1 5 0 . 2 7 5 8 0 E - 0 1 0 . 5 3 4 4 2 E - 0 1 0 . 2 8 5 6 0 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 5 7 8 8 
R D S 1 1 5 0 . 1 3 7 6 8 E - 0 1 0 . 3 1 5 3 7 E - 0 1 0 . 9 9 4 6 0 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L 1 1 5 0 . 9 3 6 7 5 E - 0 2 0 . 3 0 4 0 1 E - 0 1 0 . 9 2 4 2 3 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
R D S L L 1 1 5 0 . 4 4 4 4 2 E - 0 2 0 . 2 1 7 4 8 E - 0 1 0 . 4 7 2 9 7 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 0 9 5 6 
S H U B E I 1 1 5 0 . 4 7 4 6 1 E - 0 2 0 . 4 1 5 1 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 7 2 3 1 E - 0 4 0 . 9 3 0 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 1 6 7 1 2 E - 0 1 
L N K 1 1 5 1 0 . 1 1 5 0 . 6 9 0 1 2 0 . 4 7 6 2 6 8 . 7 9 7 2 1 2 . 2 6 6 
L N L 115-‘ 7 . 3 2 3 1 0 . 5 7 2 2 8 0 . 3 2 7 5 0 6 . 2 0 4 6 9 . 1 8 5 9 
L N M 1 1 5 9 . 1 5 7 2 0 . 8 5 9 8 6 0 . 7 3 9 3 6 7 . 5 0 6 6 1 1 . 0 0 5 
V I N T 1 1 5 1 . 8 8 8 6 0 . 5 9 4 6 9 0 . 3 5 3 6 6 1 . 1 6 8 5 4 . 9 1 5 8 
R T P L 1 1 5 0 . 7 7 1 1 1 0 . 8 5 9 6 0 0 . 7 3 8 9 1 - 0 . 1 1 2 5 8 4 . 9 4 7 2 
B O N L 1 1 5 0 . 1 5 4 9 6 0 . 1 8 4 6 9 0 . 3 4 1 1 2 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 5 3 8 0 
• 1 1 5 1 . 1 4 7 0 0 . 4 2 7 1 8 0 . 1 8 2 4 8 0 . 3 4 7 2 6 3 . 7 6 1 8 
： ^ 
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S e c t o r 4 
N 侧 E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 58 1 0 . 2 6 4 0 . 7 8 0 3 4 0 . 6 0 8 9 3 8 . 2 2 4 2 1 1 . 8 8 1 
T R D S 58 0 . 2 9 2 9 5 E - 0 1 0 . 4 7 4 3 5 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 5 0 0 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 6 4 2 2 
R D S 58 0 . 1 4 5 0 6 E - 0 1 0 . 3 1 9 9 6 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 2 3 7 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
R D S L 58 0 . 1 0 7 9 5 E - 0 1 0 . 3 0 1 1 7 E - 0 1 0 . 9 0 7 0 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
R D S L L 58 0 . 3 9 9 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 8 9 6 6 E - 0 1 0 . 3 5 9 7 0 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 4 0 2 2 
S H U B E I 58 0 . 6 1 1 7 8 E - 0 2 0 . 4 3 7 1 4 E - 0 2 0 . 1 9 1 0 9 E - 0 4 0 . 6 9 8 0 0 E - 0 3 0 . 1 7 9 1 2 E - 0 1 
L N K 58 1 0 . 6 0 6 0 . 8 3 4 3 5 0 . 6 9 6 1 5 8 . 9 6 6 9 1 2 . 7 1 5 
L N L 58 7 . 6 5 5 1 0 . 7 9 9 9 9 0 . 6 3 9 9 9 6 . 0 6 8 4 9 . 0 7 9 2 
L N M 58 9 . 6 4 8 8 0 . 8 8 8 5 4 0 . 7 8 9 5 0 7 . 3 8 4 0 1 1 . 3 5 5 
V I N T 58 1 . 6 8 8 0 0 . 4 1 0 5 7 0 . 1 6 8 5 7 0 . 1 9 0 2 0 2 . 5 4 9 3 
R T P L 58 0 . 4 5 3 2 0 0 . 5 3 0 1 6 0 . 2 8 1 0 6 - 0 . 1 4 3 3 5 2 . 4 2 3 6 
B O N L 58 0 . 1 7 2 7 2 0 . 1 6 9 2 6 0 . 2 8 6 5 0 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 4 2 1 7 
E ^ L 58 1 . 1 4 5 2 0 . 3 4 4 9 5 0 . 1 1 8 9 9 0 . 5 2 4 1 9 2 . 2 8 1 5 
S e c t o r 5 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E MINIMUM M A X I M U M 
L N Y 32 9 . 7 7 3 2 0 . 7 8 4 7 4 0 . 6 1 5 8 2 8 . 4 0 7 4 1 0 . 941 
T R D S 32 0 . 4 5 3 8 2 E - 0 1 0 . 4 4 9 4 0 E - 0 1 0 . 2 0 1 9 6 E - 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 1 3 8 6 3 
R D S 32 0 . 2 2 0 3 4 E - 0 1 0 . 2 2 7 6 5 E - 0 1 0 . 5 1 8 2 2 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L 32 0 . 1 5 4 2 1 E - 0 1 0 . 2 3 0 5 7 E - 0 1 0 . 5 3 1 6 3 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 32 0 . 7 9 2 6 2 E - 0 2 0 . 1 7 6 1 2 E - 0 1 0 . 3 1 0 1 9 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 8 1 8 8 8 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 32 0 . 2 1 1 2 2 E - 0 1 0 . 1 2 8 5 7 E - 0 1 0 . 1 6 5 3 1 E - 0 3 0 . 1 3 8 1 0 E - 0 2 0 . 4 3 3 5 5 E - 0 1 
L N K 32 1 0 . 0 0 8 0 . 7 3 9 4 8 0 , 5 4 6 8 3 8 . 7 5 6 4 1 1 . 3 4 8 
L N L 32 7 . 1 8 0 1 0.5639"7 0 . 3 1 8 0 7 6 . 4 8 9 2 8 . 0 9 6 5 
L N M - 32 8 . 7 0 0 9 1 . 0 1 7 3 1 . 0 3 4 8 6 . 8 3 8 2 1 0 . 3 0 9 
V I N T 32 1 . 5 9 1 2 0 . 3 0 1 8 2 0 . 9 1 0 9 7 E - 0 1 1 . 1 5 3 9 2 . 4 5 1 3 
R T P L 32 0 . 7 7 6 0 7 1 . 2 3 7 6 1 , 5 3 1 7 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 5 . 8 5 2 8 
B O N L 32 0 . 1 6 5 3 2 0 . 2 1 0 0 8 0 . 4 4 1 3 6 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 7 5 2 6 8 
F W L 32 1 . 1 2 6 2 0 . 4 4 0 2 0 0 . 1 9 3 7 7 0 . 3 7 5 5 4 2 . 2 8 9 6 
S e c t o r 6 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 30 9 . 0 9 1 7 0 . 5 4 5 4 1 0 . 2 9 7 4 7 7 . 8 7 8 5 1 0 . 1 6 7 
T R D S 30 0 . 1 3 4 8 0 E - 0 1 0 . 2 0 1 9 9 E - 0 1 0 . 4 0 8 0 1 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 4 9 8 7 E - 0 1 
R D S 30 0 . 6 4 8 5 1 E - 0 2 0 . 1 1 4 5 6 E - 0 1 0 . 1 3 1 2 3 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L 30 0 . 4 3 8 8 4 E - 0 2 0 . 1 1 0 9 8 E - 0 1 0 . 1 2 3 1 7 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 30 0 . 2 6 0 7 0 E - 0 2 0 . 1 0 1 3 0 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 2 6 2 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 9 1 3 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 30 0 . 3 4 3 6 9 E - 0 1 0 . 1 9 6 5 0 E - 0 1 0 . 3 8 6 1 4 E - 0 3 0 . 8 0 2 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 8 3 4 6 4 E - 0 1 
L N K 30 9 . 5 4 6 8 0 . 5 4 9 2 7 0 . 3 0 1 6 9 8 . 6 6 1 0 1 0 . 5 7 1 
L N L 30 6 . 8 6 6 4 0 . 3 5 2 7 4 0 . 1 2 4 4 3 6 . 1 9 2 4 7 .3834 
L N M 30 8 . 7 9 1 4 0 . 7 0 3 8 7 0 . 4 9 5 4 4 7 . 5 6 5 3 9 . 9 5 7 5 
V I N T 30 1 . 5 2 8 4 0 . 1 8 1 2 8 0 . 3 2 8 6 3 E - 0 1 1 . 1 7 7 8 1 . 9603 
R T P L 30 0 . 4 5 1 0 8 0 . 4 2 7 3 0 0 . 1 8 2 5 9 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 3 8 3 9 
B O N L 30 0 . 1 6 6 7 9 0 . 1 5 1 5 5 0 . 2 2 9 6 7 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 6 1 8 9 
F W L 30 1 . 2 4 2 8 0 . 5 1 3 5 6 0 . 2 6 3 7 5 0 . 5 3 6 3 5 2 . 4 7 7 6 
S e c t o r 7 
N A M E N M E A N S T . D E V V A R I A N C E M I N I M U M M A X I M U M 
L N Y 25 1 0 . 5 5 7 0 . 5 8 3 5 8 0 . 3 4 0 5 6 9 . 6 7 7 2 1 1 . 6 8 0 
T R D S 25 0 . 1 8 1 1 1 E - 0 1 0 . 1 6 3 7 1 E - 0 1 0 . 2 6 8 0 2 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 2 5 4 8 E - 0 1 
R D S 25 0 . 9 9 4 5 8 E - 0 2 0 . 1 0 9 2 2 E - 0 1 0 . 1 1 9 2 8 E - 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 4 2 5 5 8 E - 0 1 
R D S L 25 0 . 4 7 8 9 1 E - 0 2 0 . 7 7 6 0 5 E - 0 2 0 . 6 0 2 2 5 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 3 5 1 5 E - 0 1 
R D S L L 25 0 . 3 3 7 6 1 E - 0 2 0 . 7 3 4 4 7 E - 0 2 0 . 5 3 9 4 4 E - 0 4 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 2 3 5 1 5 E - 0 1 
S H U B E I 25 0 . 1 2 9 2 0 E - 0 1 0 . 6 8 2 4 0 E - 0 2 0 . 4 6 5 6 7 E - 0 4 0 . 3 0 2 7 0 E - 0 2 0 . 2 8 1 1 3 E - 0 1 
L N K 25 . 1 0 . 2 4 1 0 . 4 6 8 8 3 0 . 2 1 9 8 0 9 . 3 4 6 6 1 1 . 2 6 8 
L N L 2 5 7 . 2 1 3 9 0 . 2 0 3 9 5 0 . 4 1 5 9 6 E - 0 1 6.8427 7 . 6 3 0 9 
L N M 25 10.247 0 . 6 4 0 3 2 0 . 4 1 0 0 2 9 . 1 0 2 5 1 1 . 2 1 3 
V I N T 25 1 . 6 8 3 8 0 . 2 2 7 2 3 0 . 5 1 6 3 2 E - 0 1 1 . 3 7 9 3 2 . 2 4 1 0 ‘ 
R T P L 25 1 . 4 9 6 9 1 . 8 1 0 4 3 . 2 7 7 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 6 . 6 4 4 2 
B O N L 2 5 0 . 4 4 2 9 0 E - 0 1 0 . 1 0 2 4 2 0 . 1 0 4 9 0 E - 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 3 2 6 6 6 
F W L 25 1 . 4 2 2 9 0 . 3 4 0 3 6 0 . 1 1 5 8 4 0 . 9 1 1 0 6 2 . 1 7 6 8 
« 
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Figure 1: Industrial Management and Planning Hierachv in China 
State Council 
















O H .‘ t o 
— . • . 
o (jl H (J1 
1963 , 1 1 1 
1964 - % 
1965 - \ 




1970 - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
1971 -
1972 - 〈 
1973 - \ f 
1974 - < ^ 
\ 
1975 - H 
1976 — K ^ ^ 
；^  1977 - \ 驾 
2 ？i 1978 — 〉 o 
1979 - < ^ 
1980 — > I 
s 
1981 - • ；^ 
1982 — ^ a 
1983 — • ^ 
1984 - • 
1985 - • 
1986 — i 
1987 - \ 
1988 - \ 
1989 - / 
1990 - / 
1991 -
1992 L i 
TFP 2 
O , � O H H to ：" to 
• • • • • ‘ • 
o LTI O U1 o ⑴ 
O O O O O O 
O O O O O O 
1963 , , 1 ‘ 
1964 - ^ 
1965 - 、 
1966 - i 
1967 - ^ ^ 
1968 - m：：^^^^^ 
1969 -
1970 - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
1971 -
1972 - / 13 
1973 L 〉 I 
1974 - ^ 
1975 • 
I « 
1976 [ 1 H 
00 ；^^ 1977 卜 > S -
① 1978 - % 
1979 - f 
1980 - \ I 
1981 h h 
1982 [- • S 
\ ^ 
1983 [- 、 ^ 
1984 - 、 
1985 - • 
1986 - • 
1987 — y 
1988 - \ 
/ 
1989 I" V 
1990 - / 
1991 卜 k 
I 
1992 L i 
Changes of TFPl 
I I 1 I ：' 
(jL> to M i-» to U) tf^  cn cr> 
o o o o o o o o o o o 
I 1 1 1963 1 1 I 1 
1964 -
1965 -
1969 - 7" 
1970 -
- 与 
1973 f t 
•cijT^- S 
1975 S-
00 QJ Z 
① ^ 1978 H 
1980 实 
1981 I 
1982 V § 
1983 - \ S 
1984 - i ？ 
1985 -i ^ 
1 9 8 6 i ( -




1992 / ‘ 
Changes of TFP2 
I I ：' 
t^i bJ to M h-» to to rf：^ Ul 
o o o o o o o o o o o 








1 饥 I 
；^  1977 • 
o Pj irtrrs - H 
1980 ^ ^ ^ ^ ® 
1981 c 
\ cr 




1985 -• 丨w 
19 86<-
1 9 8 7 、 



























































































































Table 1: The Nominal Industrial Output of China: 1949-1992 (in bUlion) 
Total “ State-owned 一ShareCol lect ive-owned — ~Share~ 
Yr Output Change(%) Output Change(%) • of Output "Output Change(%) of Output 
1949 14 4 0.26 0 0.01 
1950 19 36.43 6 69,83 0.33 0 112.86 0.01 
1951 26 38.22 9 45.72 0.34 0 128.86 0.01 
1952 35 32.20 14 59.36 0.42 1 233.72 0.03 
1953 45 28.94 19 33.61 0.43 2 53.08 0.04 
1954 52 14.44 24 25.30 0.47 3 57.58 0.05 
1955 53 3.69 27 12.84 0.51 4 47.47 0.08 
1956 64 20.22 35 27.88 0.55 11 170.73 0.17 
1957 70 9.66 38 8.09 0.54 13 22.25 0.19 
1958 108 53.84 97 155.11 0.89 12 -12.45 0.11 
1959 148 36.93 131 35.98 0.89 17 44.77 0.11 
1960 164 10.38 148 12.94 0.91 15 -9.38 0.09 
1961 106 -35.13 94 -36.62 0.89 12 -20.70 0.11 
1962 92 -13.37 81 -14.07 0.88 11 -8.02 0.12 
1963 99 7.93 89 9.82 0.89 11 -5.60 0.11 
1964 116 17.22 104 17.50 0.90 12 14.91 0.10 
1965 140 20.45 126 21.16 0.90 14 14.35 0.10 
1966 162 15.83 146 15.98 0.90 16 14.55 0.10 
1967 138 -14.90 122 -16.52 0.88 16 0.00 0.12 
1968 129 -7.02 114 -7.06 0.88 15 -6.70 0.12 
1969 167 29.57 148 30.00 0.89 19 26.33 0.11 
1970 212 27.15 185 25.57 0.88 26 39.54 0.12 
1971 241 14.03 207 11.82 0.86 34 29.67 0.14 
1972 257 6.26 218 4.98 0.85 39 14.02 0.15 
1973 279 8.93 235 7.82 0.84 45 15.12 0.16 
1974 279 -0.07 230 -1.99 0.82 49 10.00 0.18 
1975 321 14.86 260 13.02 0.81 61 23.48 0.19 
1976 328 2.21 257 -1.27 0.78 71 17.13 0.22 
1977 373 13.64 287 11.75 0.77 86 20.45 0.23 
1978 424 13.74 329 14.63 0.78 95 10.77 0.22 
1979 468 10.48 367 11.69 0.78 101 6.32 0.22 
1980 515 10.11 392 6.59 0.76 121 20.41 0.24 
1981 534 3.60 404 3.10 0.76 133 9.56 0.25 
1982 581 8.83 433 7.16 0.74 144 8.50 0.25 
1983 646 11.18 474 9.56 0.73 166 15.30 0.26 
1984 762 17.90 526 11.04 0.69 226 36.07 0.30 
1985 972 27.56 630 19.75 0.65 312 37.74 0.32 
1986 1119 15.21 697 10.62 0.62 375 20.35 0.34 
1987 1381 23.39 825 18.35 0.60 478 27.46 0.35 
1988 1822 31.93 1035 25.47 0.57 659 37.76 0.36 
1989 2202 20.81 1234 19.24 0.56 786 19.29 0.36 
1990 2392 8.66 1306 5.84. 0.55 852 8.46 0.36 
1991 2825 18.07 1495 14.47 0.53 1008 18.33 0.36 
199 2 3707 31.22 1782 19.19 0.48 1410 39.83 0.38 
Average Growth Rates of Outputs (in percent); 
1949-78 1978-83 1984-88 1978-92 
Total 12.48 8.80 24.37 16.76 
State 16.76 , 7.58 18.43 12.83 
Collective 28.23 11.90 30.62 21.27 
Source: State Statistic Bureau, 1993 
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Table 2: The Technical Personnel in State and CoUective-owned Enterprises 
(The Share in total employees) 
Overall Large size Medium size Small size 
Year Average State Collective State Collect. — State Collect 
1980 2.90 160 L91 199 LSV \M L27 
1981 3.09 3.69 2.26 3.11 1.77 1.73 1.42 
1982 3.14 4.15 2.59 3.44 2.08 1.83 1.60 
1983 3.89 4.45 3.13 3.89 2.37 1.90 1.81 
1984 3.98 4.75 3.57 4.00 2.47 1.98 2.01 
1985 4.06 5.05 4.41 4.17 2.71 2.21 2.20 
1986 4.33 5.20 4.76 4.25 3.60 2.24 2.28 
1987 4.55 5.41 4.69 4.53 3.81 2.36 2.41 
1988 4.97 5.71 4.67 4.92 3.66 2.70 2.91 
1989 5.60 5.94 5.71 5.55 4.97 3.30 3.50 
1990 5.96 6.37 6.01 5.82 4.98 3.44 3.13 
Changes (in percentage) 
Overall Large size Medium size Small size 
Year Changes State Collective State Collect. State Collect 
1981 6.55 2.50 14.72 1274 5A9 I L s l 
1982 1.62 12.47 14.60 10.61 17.51 5.78 12.68 
1983 23.89 7.23 20.85 13.08 13.94 3.83 13.13 
1984 2.31 6.74 14.06 2.83 4.22 4.21 11.05 
1985 2.01 6.32 23.53 4.25 9.72 11.62 9.45 
1986 6.65 2.97 7.94 1.92 32.84 1.36 3.64 
1987 5.08 4.04 -1.47 6.59 5.83 5.36 5.70 
1988 9.23 5.55 -0.43 8.61 -3.94 14.41 20.75 
1989 12.68 4.03 22.27 12.80 35.79 22.22 20.27 
1990 6.43 7.24 5.25 4.86 0.20 4.24 -10.57 





Table 3a: Workers' Feeling When Going to Work 
Feelings 
Type of Ownership Annoyed Ordinary Pleasant 
State 8.6 59.2 322 
Collective 11.6 62.2 26.2 
Town-village 9.2 50.4 40.4 
Foreign-financed 6.3 50.2 43.6 
Source: Wu(1993), p.63. 
Table 3b: Workers' Feeling of Time at Work 
The speed of time 
Type of Ownership Very Slow Slow Fast Very Fast 
： 1 2 3 4 Average 
State ^ 2Z8 4 9 l ‘ ^ 2 . 8 6 5 
Collective 8.1 24.9 45.4 21.7 2.809 
Town-village 6.7 22.4 40.3 30.6 2.948 
Foreign-financed 4.9 21 6 51.2 22.4 2.913 
Source: Wu (1993), p.63. 
Table 3c: The Number of Days of a Worker is Absent in a Year 





Source: Wu (1993)，p.64. 
r • 
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Table 4: The Employment Structure of Chinese Labor Force. 1962-92 (in million^ 
State-Owned Collective-Owned Others 
Year Total Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
1962 43.21 33.09 0.766 10.12 0.234 一 一 
1963 43.72 32.93 0.753 10.79 0.247 一 — 
1964 46.01 34.65 0.753 11.36 0.247 一 一 
1965 49.65 37.38 0.753 12.27 0.247 — — 
1966 51.98 39.34 0.757 12.64 0.243 - -
1967 53.05 40.06 0.755 12.99 0.245 — — 
1968 55.04 41.70 0.758 13.34 0.242 — — 
1969 57.14 43.35 0.759 13.79 0.241 一 — 
1970 62.16 47.92 0.771 14.24 0.229 — -
1971 67.87 53.18 0.784 14.69 0.216 一 — 
1972 71.34 56.10 0.786 15.24 0.214 — — 
1973 73.37 57.58 0.785 15.79 0.215 一 — 
1974 76.51 60.07 0.785 16.44 0.215 — — 
1975 - 81.98 64.26 0.784 17.72 0.216 一 -
1976 86.73 68.60 0.791 18.13 0.209 一 一 
1977 91.12 71.96 0.790 19.16 0 .210 - 一 
1978 94.99 74.51 0.784 20.48 0.216 - 一 
1979 99.67 76.93 0.772 22.74 0 .228 一 一 
1980 104.44 80.19 0.768 24.25 0.232 一 一 
1981 109.40 83.72 0.765 25.68 0.235 一 一 
1982 112.81 86.30 0.765 26.51 0.235 一 -
1983 115.15 87.71 0.762 27.44 0.238 - -
1984 118.90 86.37 0.726 32.16 0.270 0.37 0.003 
1985 123.58 89.90 0.727 33.24 0.269 0.44 0.004 
1986 128.09 93.33 0.729 34.21 0.267 0.55 0.004 
1987 132.14 96.54 0.731 34.88 0.264 0.72 0.005 
1988 136.08 99.84 0.734 35.27 0.259 0.97 0.007 
1989 137.42 101.08 0.736 35.02 0.255 1.32 0.010 
1990 140.59 103.46 0.736 35.49 0.252 1.64 0.012 
1991 145.08 106.64 0.735 36.28 0.250 2.16 0.015 
1992 147.92 108.89 0.736 36.21 0.245 2.82 0.019 
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Table 6a: The Output Share of State and Collective Industry in Wuhan 
(1949-92) " “ 
State Collective Other types 
Year Owned Owned Ownership 
1949 0.07 0.01 0.92 
1950 0.11 0.01 0.88 
1951 0.16 0.01 0.82 
1952 0.26 0.05 0.69 
1953 0.31 0.06 0.63 
1954 0.38 0.06 0.56 
1955 0.45 0.08 0.47 
1956 0.44 0.20 0.36 
1957 0.45 0.20 0.34 
1958 0.67 0.04 0.29 
1959 0.91 0.09 0.00 
1960 0.92 0.08 0.00 
1961 0.89 0.11 0.00 
1962 0.87 0.11 0.01 
1963 0.89 0.11 0.01 
1964 0.89 0.11 0.01 
1965 0.89 0.11 0.00 
1966 0.88 0.12 0.00 
1967 0.86 0.14 0.00 
1968 0.83 0.17 0.00 
1969 0.85 0.15 0.00 
1970 0.86 0.14 0.00 
1971 0.87 0.13 0.00 
1972 0.87 0.13 0.00 
1973 0.87 0.13 0.00 
1974 0.82 0.18 0.00 
1975 0.83 0.17 0.00 
1976 0.80 0.20 0.00 
1977 0.81 0.19 0.00 
1978 0.83 0.17 0.00 
1979 0.83 0.16 0.00 
1980 0.81 0.17 0.01 
1981 0.80 0.18 0.02 
1982 0.79 0.19 0.02 
1983 0.79 0.20 0.02 
1984 0.77 0.21 0.02 
1985 0.75 0.23 0.02 
1986 0.74 0.24 0.03 
1987 0.73 0.24 0.03 
1988 0.71 0.24 0.04 
1989 0.71 0.19 0.10 
1990 0.69 0.18 0.13 
1991 0.73 0.15 0.12 
199 2 221 0.16 0.14 
Sources: Wuhan Statistical Data Vol.1 (1990) 
Wuhan Statistical Yearbook 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993 , 
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Table 6h: The Industrial Outnut of Wuhan (in 8fl’s price level, in million. RMB) 
Total Changes Light Changes Heavy Changes 
Year Output (%) Industry- (%) Share Industry (%) Share 
1949 198 185 0.93 13 0 07 
1950 299 51.29 280 51.37 0.94 19 50.08 0.06 
1951 355 18.63 322 15.08 0.91 33 69.99 0 09 
1952 432 21.75 385 19.55 0.89 47 43 24 Oi l 
1953 593 37.24 525 36.43 0.89 68 43.87 0.11 
1954 720 21.42 634 20.80 0.88 86 26.20 0 12 
1955 807 12.15 692 9.07 0.86 116 35.02 0.14 
1956 1132 40.23 911 31.78 0.81 220 90.80 0.19 
1957 1269 12.10 1016 11.52 0.80 253 14.53 0.20 
1958 1843 45.28 1219 19.98 0.66 624 147.10 0.34 
1959 2849 54.57 1723 41.27 0.60 1127 80.56 0.40 
1960 3196 12.16 1679 -2.53 0.53 1517 34.61 0.47 
1961 1516 -52.55 922 -45.12 0.61 595 -60.78 0.39 
1962 1532 1.00 1010 9.59 0.66 522 -12.29 0.34 
1963 1767 15.38 1137 12.56 0.64 630 20.86 0.36 
1964 2188 23.81 1277 12.35 0.58 911 44.48 0.42 
1965 2717 24.20 1470 15.14 0.54 1247 36.89 0.46 
1966 3385 24.56 1782 21.16 0.53 1603 28.58 0.47 
1967 2843 -16.00 1694 -4.91 0.60 1149 -28.33 0.40 
1968 2026 -28.75 1333 -21.30 0.66 693 -39.72 0.34 
1969 2844 40.37 1688 26.58 0.59 1156 66.90 0.41 
1970 4270 50.16 2122 25.74 0.50 2148 85.81 0.50 
1971 4970 16.39 2381 12.22 0.48 2589 20.50 0.52 
1972 5117 2.96 2311 -2.95 0.45 2806 8.39 0.55 
1973 5683 11.07 2323 0.51 0.41 3360 19.76 0.59 
1974 4324 -23.92 2133 -8.19 0.49 2191 -34.80 0.51 
1975 5914 36.78 2756 29.21 0.47 3158 44.15 0.53 
1976 4626 -21.79 2261 -17.94 0.49 2364 -25.15 0.51 
1977 5862 26.72 2822 24.79 0.48 3040 28.57 0.52 
1978 7281 24.21 3278 16.18 0.45 4002 31.67 0.55 
1979 8775 20.52 3963 20.88 0.45 4812 20.22 0.55 
1980 10170 15.90 4897 23.58 0.48 5272 9.57 0.52 
1981 10873 6.92 5720 16.80 0.53 5153 -2.26 0.47 
1982 11578 6.48 5945 3.94 0.51 5633 9.30 0.49 
1983 12740 10.04 6244 5.03 0.49 6497 15.34 0.51 
1984 14260 11.93 6720 7.62 0.47 7540 16.07 0.53 
1985 16334 14.54 7623 13.45 0.47 8710 15.52 0.53 
1986 17523 7.28 8109 6.37 0.46 9414 8.08 0.54 
1987 19271 9.98 .8895 9.70 0.46 10376 10.21 0.54 
1988 21968 14.00 10194 14.60 0.46 11774 13.48 0.54 
1989 22416 2.04 10043 -1,48 0.45 12373 5.08 0.55 
1990 21870 -2.44 9616 -4.25 0.44 12254 -0.96 0.56 
1991 24576 12.38 10382 7.96 0.42 14195 15.84 0.58 
1992 27259 10.91 10929 5.27 0.40 16329 15.04 0.60 
Average GrowthRate of Total Output (in percent) 
1949-78 1023 1988-92 5 3 4 S o u r c e s : Wuhan Statistical Data VoL 1 (1990) 
1978-83 11 84 1978-92 9.89 Wuhan Statistical Yearbook, 1990, 1991, 
1984-88 11.41 1992, 1993. 
* 
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Table 7: Estimated Results for the Time-Series Data 
Depending Variable: LNY 
R1 R2 R3 
Common Adjested for 
Variables General Factor test Common factor 
DB84 -0.2246 -0.0619 -0.1984 
(-2.0080) (-0.4885) (-1.8010) 
DCAP -0.2477 -0.2965 -0.3420 
(-2.7360) (-3.9540) (-5.3310) 
* * * * * * * * 
COMP -0.2386 -0.8619 -0.8077 
(-0.2454) (-0.9038) (-1.7470) 
LNK 0.5855 0.3437 0.4600 
(2.7650) (1.1070) (5.3990) 
* * * * * 
LNL 0.4991 0.4481 0.5107 
(1.4670) (0.9932) (1.1870) 
L N Y ( t - l ) -- 0.4766 0.4954 
-- (2.9370) (3.0420) 
• • • * • 
DB84(t-l) -- 0.0217 0.0785 
- (0.1784) (2.2211) 
* 
DCAP(t-l) - -0.0342 0.1416 
- (-0.4217) (3.0700) 
* * * 
COMP(t-l) - 1.6218 0.3251 
- (L4480) (0.3739) 
LNK(t-l) - -0.0248 -0.1787 
-- (-0.8873) (-3.3490) 
* * * 
LNL(t-l) - -0.3489 -0.2708 
-- (-0.7253) (-0.8303) 
CONSTANT -0.7793 1.3575 0.1981 
(-0.4067) (0.8674) (0.8814) 
Adjusted R-square 0.9600 0.9792 0.9766 
Test: 
CRTS (T-stat.) - -- --
DW-Test 0.9951 2.1162 --
Common factor test 1.5783 ~ 
(F-statistic) 
Durbin-H statistic ~ ~ ~ 
(Asymtotic Nomal) . 
Degrees of Feedom ’ ‘ ^ ^ 23 ‘ 
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Table 7: Estimated Results for the Time-Series Data (mntimip) 
Depending Variable: LNY 
R4 R5 R6 R7 
Common Adjested for Adjested for 
Variables General Factor test AR(1) ARi^ D&GH丁S 
z — r 
• • - - — • • 
DCAP -0.2712 -0.3598 -0.2803 -0.2744 
(-3.2770) (-6.0600) (-4.0460) (-3.9200) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
COMP - __ . . . . 
— - — 
LNK 0.8307 0.2855 0.7164 0.8849 
(4.4420) (0.9593) (3.1810) (6.9130) *** *** 
LNL 0.2231 0.5555 0.4393 0.1151 
(0.7248) (1.3710) (1.1650) (0.8890) 
LNY(t-l) - 0.5430 -- -
- (3.8730) - -
* * * 
DB84(t-l) - - - -
— •糧 
DCAP(t-l) - 0.0413 -- --
-- (0.5859) - -
COMP(t-l) - - - -
—— —— • • • • 
LNK(t-l) - 0.0636 -- --
- (0.2369) - -
LNL(t-l) -- -0.4790 - -
-- (-1.0130) - -
CONSTANT -0.6615 0.5041 -1.9591 0.0104 
(-0.3986) (0.3390) (-0.9008) (0.1694) 
Adjusted R-square 0.9560 0.9792 0.9681 0.9679 
Test: 
CRTS (T-stat.) -- -- 0.3730 -
DW-Test 0.8598 2.0601 - --
Common factor test - 3.2345 ~ ~ 
(F-statistic) * 
Durbin-H statistic -- - 1.7504 1.9211 
(Asymtotic Nomal) 
Degree) of Feedom 27 22 27 28 
Figures in paretheses are t-statistics 
CRTS stands for constant return to scale, Le. LNK+LNL=1 
*，** and *** means that the estimates are statistically significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively'." 
DW-statistics: 5 percent significant points of dL and dU when 
(a) number of regressor excluding intercept=5 and no. of obs.=30 is 1.071 and 1.833 rep. 
(b) number of regressor excluding intercept=3 and no. of obs.=30 is 1.214 and 1.650 rep. 
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Table 8: The Total Factor Productivity of Wuhan, 1962-92 
Yr TFP 1 level Chan联 in TFP 11 TFP2 level Change in TFP2 
1962 1.000 LOOO 
1963 1.462 46.187 1.462 46.187 
1964 1.680 14.906 1.680 14 906 
1965 1.787 6.411 1.787 6.411 
1966 1.782 -0.316 1.782 -0.316 
1967 1.307 -26.649 1.720 -3 489 
1968 0.870 -33.468 1.144 -33.468 
1969 1.382 58.975 1.382 20.825 
1970 2.078 50.327 2.078 50.327 
1971 1.598 -23.090 1.598 -23.090 
1972 1.454 -9.016 1.454 -9.016 
1973 1.634 12.382 1.634 12.382 
1974 1.377 -15.716 1.416 -13.371 
1975 1.460 5.984 1.460 3.115 
1976 1.073 -26.486 1.412 -3.275 
1977 1.270 18.318 1.671 18.318 
1978 1.415 11.461 1.415 -15.286 
1979 1.239 -12.434 1.239 -12.434 
1980 1.451 17.092 1.451 17.092 
1981 1.431 -1.400 1.431 -1.400 
1982 1.431 0.044 1.431 0.044 
1983 1.519 6.117 1.519 6.117 
1984 1.570 3.372 1.570 3.372 
1985 1.616 2.896 1.616 2.896 
1986 1.563 -3.292 1.563 -3.292 
1987 1.624 3.950 1.624 3.950 
1988 1.746 7.481 1.746 7.481 
1989 1.569 -10.110 1.569 -10.110 
1990 1.432 -8.722 1.432 -8.722 
1991 1.491 4.125 1.491 4.125 
19921 1.490 -0.1251 1.490 -0.125 
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Table 10: The Correlation among RTPL, BONL and FWL 
OLS LNY RTPLl RTPL2 RTPL3 RTPL4 RTPL5 RTPL6 RTPL7 & 
BONLl B0NL2 B0NL3 B0NL4 B0NL5 BONL6 B0NL7 & 
FWLl FWL2 FWL3 FWL4 FWL5 FWL6 FWL7 
AUXIL IARY REGRESSIONS: 
R-SQUARE OF RTPLl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4630 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5089 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4146 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4948 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6788 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5035 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4142 
R-SQUARE OF BONLl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABILES = 0 .1995 
R-SQUARE OF B0NL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4178 
R-SQUARE OF B0NL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.2 644 
R-SQUARE OF B0NL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4204 
R-SQUARE OF B0NL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 . 6920 
R-SQUARE OF BONL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4527 
R-SQUARE OF BONL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1379 
R-SQUARE OF FWLl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6758 
R-SQUARE OF FWL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6485 
R-SQUARE OF FWL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7122 
R-SQUARE OF FWL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7446 
R-SQUARE OF FWL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6126 
R-SQUARE OF FWL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .5816 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 The F-statistics are with 7 and 272 degree of freedom. 
冊
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 significant level respectively. 
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Table 14a: Auxiliary Regressions of Variables from Table 12c 
R-SQUARE OF T88 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 3466 
R-SQUARE OF T89 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 5121 
R-SQUARE OF RTPROFO ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 3660 
R-SQUARE OF TRDSl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 522 8 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 6950 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 1999 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 4 656 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8090 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4027 
R-SQUARE OF TRDS7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.74 62 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEIl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0:4187 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEI2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8572 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEI3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8423 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEI4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0:8414 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEI5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8822 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEIS ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0!9347 
R-SQUARE OF SHUBEI7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9454 
R-SQUARE OF LNKl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9993 
R-SQUARE OF LNK2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9985 
R-SQUARE OF LNK3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9981 
R-SQUARE OF LNK4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9988 
R-SQUARE OF LNK5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9993 
R-SQUARE OF LNK6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9983 
R-SQUARE OF LNK7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9994 
R-SQUARE OF LNLl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9962 
R-SQUARE OF LNL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9963 
R-SQUARE OF LNL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9978 
R-SQUARE OF LNL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9979 
R-SQUARE OF LNL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9987 
R-SQUARE OF LNL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9978 
R-SQUARE OF LNL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9995 
R-SQUARE OF LNMl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9992 
R-SQUARE OF LNM2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9980 
R-SQUARE OF LNM3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9962 
R-SQUARE OF LNM4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9978 
R-SQUARE OF LNM5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9973 
R-SQUARE OF LNM6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9990 
R-SQUARE OF LNM7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9995 
R-SQUARE OF VINTl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9469 
R-SQUARE OF VINT2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .9675 
R-SQUARE OF VINT3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8889 
R-SQUARE OF VINT4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9366 
R-SQUARE OF VINT5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9705 
R-SQUARE OF VINT6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9869 
R-SQUARE OF VINT7 ON OTHER IJilDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9845 
R-SQUARE OF RTPLl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6292 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5939 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .5588 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 . 6334 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6852 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7552 
R-SQUARE OF RTPL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6559 
R-SQUARE OF CONSTANT ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.0000 
* 
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Table 14b: Auxiliary Regressions of Variables from Table 13a 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDSI ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8259 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.3681 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8824 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7637 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9305 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8900 
R-SQUARE OF ATRDS7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5978 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBEIl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8078 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBE工2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4746 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBE工3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.8588 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBEI4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7828 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBEI5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABILES = 0 .9341 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBEI6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.9260 
R-SQUARE OF ASHUBEI7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6168 
R-SQUARE OF ALNKI ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7080 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6329 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.3402 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.53 85 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5791 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4501 
R-SQUARE OF ALNK7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6941 
R-SQUARE OF ALNLI ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1535 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4309 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1842 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.0966 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.2099 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1920 
R-SQUARE OF ALNL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5564 
R-SQUARE OF ALNMI ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6485 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5850 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4332 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .6421 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5348 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.7173 
R-SQUARE OF ALNM7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6541 
R-SQUARE OF AVINTl ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1307 
R-SQUARE OF AVINT2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .1887 
R-SQUARE OF AVINT3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1660 
R-SQUARE OF AVINT4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1981 
R-SQUARE OF AVINT5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES •= 0.132 7 
R-SQUARE OF AVINTS ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.6163 
R-SQUARE OF AVINT7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .3384 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPLI ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.1585 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL2 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.264 6 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL3 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0 .4623 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL4 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.3869 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL5 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.4567 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL6 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5997 
R-SQUARE OF ARTPL7 ON OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES = 0.5806 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16: The Percentage of Dismissed Worker 
- State-Owned 一 Collective-owned 
Large Medium Small Large Medium Small 
1986 0.173 0.147 0.130 0.134 0.136 0.348 
1987 0.150 0.168 0.132 0.251 0.173 0.194 
1988 0.184 0.169 0.162 0.197 0.279 0.267 
1989 0.167 0.174 0.144 0.145 0.205 0.308 
1990 0.094 0.114 0.111 0.135 0.145 0.258 
Source: Guoyou, Feiguoyou Qiyue Bijiao Yanjiu Ketizu, 1993, p.l6. 
« 
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Table 17: The estimated VMPK VMPL. and V M P M of the State-owned Fnf^mH .P. 
in Wuhan. 1987-89 
Factor "“ 
Return Year N Mean ST. Dev. Coef.Var. Mia Max. 
VMPK 1987 131 0.5641 0.4728 0.8381 0.0055 1.6962 
1988 131 0.6069 0.5501 0.9064 0.0068 2.5063 
1989 129 0.5384 0.5478 1.0174 0.0043 3.0791 
VMPL 1987 124 2.8549 2.8342 0.9927 0.0124 13.3470 
1988 113 3.8356 4.5242 1.1795 0.0833 21.5390 
1989 112 4.0856 4.3341 1.0608 0.0884 20.1890 
VMPM 1987 131 0.8162 0.4733 0.5799 0.1442 2.4123 
1988 131 0.9624 0.5472 0.5685 0.2266 2.7875 
1989 131 1.0094 0.5623 0.5571 0.1932 2.9050 
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